LexINDERJEET KAUR versus NIRPAL SINGH
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
INDERJEET KAUR
A
v.
NIRPAL SINGH
DECEMBER 15, 2000
[D.P. MOHAPATRA AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]
B
Rent Central and Eviction :
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Sections 14(/){e), 25B(4) & (5)-
Eviction Petition-Bona fide Requirement-Leave to defend-Grant of-Held, C
at a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima
facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order of el'iction-lt would not be a right approach
to say that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as
would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend should not be granted
D
Landlord settled abroad with his family seeking eviction of tenant
stating that he had come back and permanently settled in India-Application
filed by tenant seeking leave to contest, rejected-Tenability of-Held, the
Additional Rent Controller has acted with material irregularity and committed
a manifest error in accepting the case of the landlord when the facts were E
seriously disputed and the correctness or otherwise of the documents required
to be examined-Ai:ijudication of the case on merits at the stage of granting
leave to defend is beyond the jurisdiction and statutory duty cast on the
Additional Rent Controller.
Respondent-landlord who had settled abroad with his family, filed an F
eviction petition under Section l4(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act seeking
eviction of the appellant-tenant from the suit premises. The eviction was sought
on the ground of his bonafide requirement for his occupation as a residence
for himself and his family members stating that he had come back and
permanently settled in India. The appellant-tenant filed an application seeking G
leave to contest the application for eviction which was rejected by the
Additional Rent Controller and an order of eviction was passed against him
in respect of the suit premises. Civil Revision filed in the High Court was
also dismissed. Hence the present appeal.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the facts stated. and H
707
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A substantial grounds raised in the application seeking leave to defend clearly
disclosed that the respondent would be disentitled from obtaining an order
for the recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified in
Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act; that the approach of the
Additional Rent Controller in dealing with the application made for grant of
leave to defend was not proper having regard to the scope of Section 258(4)
B & (5) of the Act; that several triable issues did arise for consideration in the
light of the facts stated and rival contentions raised; that the disputed facts
could not be decided at the time of considering the application for grant of
leave.
c
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: I. The Additional Rent Controller has considered merits of the
respective contentions at the stage of granting leave to defend under section
258 (5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act without keeping in mind the scope of
the provisions and statutory duty cast on him. He exceeded the jurisdiction
D vested in him in refusing leave to defend. It appears that he did not focus his
attention to the scope and content of Section 258(5). Having regard to the
facts stated and grounds raised in the affidavit filed by the appellant seeking
leave to defend, it is not possible to take a view that no triable issue arose for
consideration. The facts stated in the affidavit of the appellant in support of
his application seeking leave to defend prima facie do disclose that the
E respondent would be disentitled to obtain an order for the recovery of
possession of the premises from the appellant particularly when other cases
are pending between the parties and defence does not appear to be frivolous
or untenable on the face of it. The Additional Rent Controller has acted with
material irregularity and committed a manifest error in accepting the case
F of the respondent-landlord when the facts were seriously disputed and the
correctness or otherwise of the documents required to be examined.
[716-D, E, F, G)
Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nanci, (1983) 1 SCC 301, relied on.
G
Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva
Tayal, (198213 SCC 270, referred to.
2. The ground under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section
14 enables a landlord to rExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.