IN THE MATTER OF MR. 'G', A SENIOR ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT. versus NO RESPONDENT

Citation: [1955] 1 S.C.R. 490 · Decided: 27-05-1954 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

'490 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
IN THE MATTER OF Mr. 'G', 
A SENIOR ADVOCATE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT. 
[1955} 
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM 
HASAN, and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.] 
Supreme Court Rules-Order IV, rule 30-Advocau-Supreme 
Court-Agreement between him and his client for sha,.ing recoveries 
in the legal 
proceedings-Whether 
professional 
misconduct-Pro-
--( 
fessional conduct of Advocate of Supreme Court in vietv of his special 
privikges and status. 
The act of. an Advocate of the Supreme Court in entering into 
an agreement with a client whereby the client undertakes to pay 
him a part of anY recoveries he might make in the legal proceed-
ings in respect of which he is employed, amounts to professional 
misconduct and makes him liable for disciplinary 
action 
and . to 
this extent the ordihary legal rights of contract do not apply to 
an Advocate as such. 
k 
Such agreements are not permissible to advocates 
under 
the 
rigid rules of conduct enjoined by the profession so that their 
integrity, dignity and honour may be placed above the 
breath of 
scandal. 
An Advocate of the Supreme Court is governed by special and 
rigid rules of professional conduct expected of and 
appiied 
to 
a 
specially 
privileged class of persons who because of their privileged 
status are· subject to certain disabilities 
which do 
not attach 
to 
other men and which do not even attach to an 
Advocate 
while 
acting othen vise than as Advocate. 
An Ad· rocate is therefore bound to conduct himself in a 
manner befit ting the high and honourable 
profession the privileges 
of which he enjoys and if he departs from the high standards which 
that profession has set for itself and demands of him he renders 
himself liable to disciplinary action. 
Original (Disciplinary) Jurisdiction. 
In the matter of summons issued to Mr. 'G' under rule 30 of 
Order IV, Supreme Court Rules, to show cause to this Court why ~l 
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. 
The material facts 
of the· case 
are stated in the .Judgment; 
Order IV rule 30 of the Supreme Court rules runs as follows :-
"Where on the 
complaint of any 
person or 
otherwise the 
Court is of opinion that an Advocate has been guilty of misconduct 
or of conduct unbecoming an Advocate, the Court may debar him 
from practising before the Court either permanently or for such 
period as the Court may think fit, and the Registrar, shall there· 
upon report his name to his own High Court" ; 
-
-
-
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
491 
~' 
"Provided that the Court shall in the first 
instance direct 
a 
summons to issue returnable before the Court or before a Special 
Bench to be constituted by the Chief Justice, requiring the Advo-
cate to show cause against the matter alleged in the summons, and 
the summons shall, if possible, be served personally upon him with 
copies of any affidavit or statement before the Court at the 
time 
of the issue of the summons." 
, 
G in person : 
Amarnath was the client. 
He had 
admittedly a just cause 
and the High. Court has held that the terms came from him and 
were accepted out of compassion. 
I submit that in such 
circums-
tances 
the 
agreement 
was 
neither 
professionally 
nor 
morally 
improper. English law of Champerty and Maintenance does not 
apply to India; Please see Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chundet· Canto 
Mookerjee (1876) LR. 4 I.A. 23; Bhagwat 
Dayal Singh v. Debi 
Dayal Sahu ( 1907) LR. 35 I.A. 48. 
Prior to 1926 
there 
was a 
distinction between Pleaders, 
Advocates 
and Barristers. 
Barristers 
~ could not enter into contractual relationship. 
They could not sue 
or be sued: Deo Kisen v. Budh Prakash (1833) I.LR. 25 All. 509 
F.B. This was in accordance with the English rules of professional 
etiquette among Barristers, but 
Pleaders 
and 
Advocates 
could 
enter into contractual relations. 
Contingent fees 
have been known 
and recognised in India at any rate since 1814. Please see sec. 25, 
Bengal Regulation XXVII of 1814, and sec. 52, Bombay Regulation 
II of 1827. 
Contractual rights were extended 
in 
1846. 
Please 
see Pleaders 
Act I of 1846 ; Please 
see 
sec. 7 as 
to fees. 
But 
agreements had to be registered with the Court to be enforceable. 
Wide changes in all these matters came about 
by legislation 
in 
1926 
(Legal Practitioners' Fees Act, 1926). Barristers, Attorneys, 
Advocates, Pleaders all came within the definition of Legal Practi-
tioners, who may now sue and 
be 
sued and may enter into and 
ma

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