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IBRAHIM AND ORS. versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.

Citation: [1968] 2 S.C.R. 306 · Decided: 21-11-1967 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HIDAYATULLAH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

306 
IBRAHIM AND ORS. 
, .. 
STATE OF WEST .BENGAL AND ANR. 
November 21, 1967 
(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, ss. 191(1) (a) and (b), 
194(b) and 
( e), and 436--Seamen entering into agreement with shipping company to 
navigat,e its ship for specified period-dispute arisinR while ship in dock 
on a voyage as to amoun1t of bazar money payable to seamen-on non-
pay1nent of a1nount clain1ed se(unen leaving ship which could not therefore 
sail-1vhether seamen liable for desertion.-Reasonable cause for leaving 
ship-when relevant. 
The ten appellants were ratings who had entered into an agreement 
\Vith a shipping company in Cochin to navigate one of its ships bet\v~en 
December 11, 1963 and Juno 10, 1964. 
During this period, after they 
had performed some voyages and while the ship was berthed in Calcutta 
port, a. dispute arose between the appellants and the Company as to the 
payment of bazar money (victualling charges) which the ratings were 
allowed according to a custom obtaining in 
merchant shipping. 
The 
appellants claimed Re. 1 per day while the Company normally paid only 
0.6'.C P. per day, The dispute was referred to the Shipping Master, Calcutta, 
\.\'hereupon rneejings took place l::Β·~tween 
representatives 
of 
the 
Com-
pany and the appellants before the Shipping Master and an agreement 
was reached according to which the Company promised to pay the amount 
claimed. 
However, it was not clear whether this payment was to be 
made before the commencement of the next voyage or on the termina-
tion of the agreement. 
As the appellants were in fact not paid before 
the commencement of the voyage, upon the instigation of certain Jabour 
leaders they left the vessel in a body and, as a result, the ship could not 
leave port at the appointed time of sailing. 
The appellants were there-
after prosecuted for deserting the ship and were convicted under s. 19 I 
(1 )(al and (bl ands. 194(b) and (<e) read withs. 436 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act. 1958. 
Their revision applications to the High Court were 
summarily rejected. 
In the appeal to this Court by special leave, it was contended on be-
half of the appellants (a) that there was no desertion on their part, and 
(b) that even if they be held to 'have left the ship, they were protected 
by the fact that there was reasonable cause for absenting themselves at 
the time of the sailing of the ship. 
HELD : dismissing the appeal : 
( il The gist of desertion is the existence of animus not to return to 
the ship or, in other words, to go against the agreements under which the 
en1ployn1ent of seamen for Sf'a vovagr<; generally take olace. 
The 'vav 
the appellants had acted clearly showed that they were using the weapon 
of strike with a view to force the issue with their employers and were 
not intending to return to the vessel unless their demandiS \Vere acceded 
to immediately. It was therefore Je~itimate to infer that they were brealc-
ing the agreement with the company 'Mhich was to keep the ship in voy-
age up 10 June 10, 1964, and this wa< rendered impossible by all 
the 
nppellants 
abscntin~ themselves. 
Their action 
therefore 
amounted 
to 
desertion. r309 B. F-G] 
.A 
β€’ 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
IBRAHIM v. w. BENGAL (Hidayatullah, J.) 
307 
Moore v. Canddian Pacific Steamship Co., [1945] 1 All B.R. 
128; 
The West-morland, {1841) 1 Wm. Rob 216; referred to. 
(ii), Section 191(1) is in two parts. 
The first part deals wi:h only 
desertion and therefore, if desertion was proved, the penalty which the 
law provides under the .A.ct was duly incurred. There is no excuse against 
desertion because reasonable cause which is indicated in the sam~ section 
is included in cl. (b) and not in cl. (a). In the prosent case there was 
not that sufficient cause even for the purpose of cl. (b) of s. 191(1). Tue 
dispute was already . before tbe Shipping Master, 
meetings hwl taken 
place and minutes had been recΒ·.:ir<led. 
Th~ log book ..:it the shipping 
Company and other records would clearly show the amount of money 
due to the appella'Ots. 
The settlement of the claim could well have wait-
ed till the completion of the voyage and there was machinery in law for 
the enforcement of a demand. [309 H; 310 D-FJ 
The law has chosen to regard the duties of seamen as of paramount 
importance and has therefore, in addition to the ordinary liabilities which 
arise under the general law, added a penalty of imprisonment for abse

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