HOSHNAK SINGH versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Citation: [1979] 3 S.C.R. 399 · Decided: 27-02-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.N. SHINGAL · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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399 
HOSHNAK SINGH 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
February 27, 1979 
[P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] 
Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-Ss. 10' & 
12-Scope of. 
Res judicata-Principles analogous to res judicata when could be invoked. 
A 
B 
A part of the land allotted to the appellant on quasi-permanent basis as a 
displaced person from West Pakistan was acquired by the Government. 
Wben 
C 
the question of payment of compensation in respect of the land acquired w:.1s 
pending, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 
was passed which enabled holders of quasi-pe.rmanency rights to obtain pernta-
nent settlement pursuant to which permanent settlement in respect of acquired 
land was made in favour of the appellant. 
AJJeging that the land allotted to the appellant was not allottable on a pcrrna-
D 
nent basis, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated 17th March, 
1961, cance11ed the allotment. The appellant's petition questioning the correct-
ness of this decision was dismissed by the High Court in limine. 
Thereupon the appellant preferred a petition under s. 33 of the Act to the 
Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Rehabilitation Department, challeng-
ing the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. 
By his order dated 29th 
September, 1964 the Joint Secretary rejected the petition pointing out that the 
cancellation of the appellant's permanent settlement rights in the land was in 
accordance with law and that no interference was called for. 
lbe appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court. 
In rejecting 
the 
appellant's writ petition 
impugning the 
order dated 
29th Septem-
ber, 1964 the High Court was of the view that it was barred by princinfes 
E 
analogous to res judicata because if that petition were 
aI1owed, it would in 
F 
effect, amount to cancellation of the order dated the 17th March, 1961 which 
beclame final as against the appellant on dismissal of his first petition. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HEID : l(a) Where a petition under Art. 226 is dismissed in limine with-
out a speaking order, such a dismissal would not constitute a bar of res judicata 
to a subsequent petition on the same cause of action. 
When a 
petition is 
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dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way 
of appeal or revision under a statute and on failure to get relief after pursuing 
the remedy by way of appeal or revision, he moved the High Court, it would 
be incorrect to dismiss the petition on the ground that the order made by the 
re\'isional authority had the effect of merging the orieinal order with the order 
of the revisional authority, and that the challenge on the fresh cause of actifln 
to the order of the revisional authority would of neces~itv be a cha11enge to the 
H 
original order also and that therefore the petition would be barred bv nrinciples 
analogous to res judicata as the first order had become final. 
[407C-E] 
6-253SCI/79 
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B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
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ff 
400 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
11979] 3 s.c.R. 
Daryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 574; Virudhunagar 
Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Govt. of Madras, [1968] 2 SCR 740; Tilokchand 
Motichand & Ors. v. H. B. Munshi & Anr., [1969] 2 SCR 824; referred to. 
In the instant case in the first wTit petition the appellant questioned the cor· 
rcctness of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 17th March, 
1961 without claiming therein any compensation for the land a1:quired. 
That 
having been dismissed in linline he invoked the revisional jurisdiction under s. 33 
of the Act. 
When that petition was dismissed by the revisional authority he 
preferred the second writ petition. What he prayed in the second petition was 
a direction quashing the order dated 29th September, 1964 of the Joint Secretary 
to the Government of India. The High Court was, therefore, in error in reject-
ing the second petition on the sole ground that the order of 17th March, 1961 
merged into the order of 29th September, 1964 and in substance: the challenge 
was to the order dated 17th March, 1961 which had become final. [40d A-Bl 
(b) Secondly, if the claim for compensation was not raised in 
the 
first 
petition but was specifically raised in the second, it would not be dismissed on 
the ground that it \Vas barred by principles analogous to res judicata. f408 D] 
2 (a) It has been well established by a long line of decisions of this Court
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