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HOSHIAR SINGH versus GURBACHAN SINGH

Citation: [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 127 · Decided: 08-02-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.K. DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

-
3 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
HOSHIAR SINGH 
v. 
GURBACHAN SINGH 
(S. K. DAS, K. SUBBA RAO and RAGHUBAR 
DAYAL, JJ.) 
127 
Contempt of Court-Issue of prohibitory order-Knowledge 
aliunde-Disobedience-Absence of official communication, if a 
proper defence-Senttnce. 
The appellants,· one a Sub-Divisional Officer and the 
other a 
Naib Tehsildar, were 
entrusted with the duty 
of allotting land to displaced persons. The first respondent 
forcibly occupied the land allotted to B. On May 9, 1958, 
the first 
appellant ordered that B 
and other allottees 
similarly situated would be given possession of lands allotted 
to them on May 20, 1958. On May 16, 1958, the first 
respondent and 
others threatened with dispossession filed 
petitions in the High Court under Art. 226 of the constitu-
tion and obtained interim 
~tay of delivery of possession till 
May 19, 1958, when the petitions would come· up before 
the Division Benc;h for admission. On May 19, 1958, the 
Division Bench extended the operation of the stay 
order 
until May 23, 1958. The notice of the first stay order reached 
the appellants on May 19, 1958, but no notice of the second 
order was officially communicated to them till May 21, 1958. 
It was alleged that on May 20, 1958, the appellants, although 
informed of the second stay order by certain interested 
persons and the Advocate for orie of the parties, form:illy 
dispossessed_ the respondent in disob~dience of the Court's 
order and handed over possession of the land to B. 
On the 
complaint of the respondent the High C0urt held that the 
appellants were guilty of contempt of court and·,· instead of 
committing them for contempt, administrated a warning as 
the appellants honestly believed that they were not bound to 
stay delivery of possession in absence of an official communi~ 
cation. The appellants appealed by special leave. 
Held, (per Das and Subba Rao, .JJ.)that in a case.pf con· 
tempt for disobedience of a prohibitive order, as distinguished 
from an order of affirmative nature, it was not necessary to 
show that notice of the prohibitory order was served upon 
the party against whom it was granted. It would be sufficient 
if it was proved that the party had notice of it aliunde. 
N. Baksi v. C. K. Ghosh, A. T. R. (1957) Patn. 528, 
referred to. 
1962 
Februa'} 8. 
1962 
H()shiar Singh 
v. 
Gurbacha1, Si11:h 
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. 
There may Le circumstances where officials entrusted 
\\'ith the carryinR" out of a Jcgal order mighr have valid reasons 
~o dru ht 1 lic aut.hf'nticity of. the order con\'cycd to them hy 
1nl<>rested 
part1e~. 
But 
1n the present cast' there could 
hardly he any such rt·ason!'.. The appellants had really no 
justification for doubting the 
authenticitv of an 
ordr.r 
cornmunica ted to them hy- an A<lvocatc. 
' 
. 
H"Ti/, furthr-r. t}1at in a m;i;tter reJating to contempt of 
co11rt, thrre cannot he hoth j11stification and apology. 
M. Y. S/.ni.,f v. 'J'he Tfon'lil, .TurlgPS of the Tligh Court of 
l\'ngr.ur. [lg'"l I~- C'. R. 757, referred to. 
A lthm1~h thr appellants mi~ht hav• hnn.,.tly believed 
tl-<lt 1hr\0 \\·rrl" not l-ounrl to hoJ<l thf'ir hand in absence of an 
offcial rrimm11nirati0n. that wo111(1 be no defence to the 
rl1tlr_!"'r nf r0nt<'mpt of ~011rt, hut only a relevant consideration 
in a\\·arding- the 5Pntenrr. 
p,,,r 
Da\'al. J.-Contr.mpt proct-erlin.vs are c:riminal 
or Olltlsi 
<'riminal in naturt" and it i" essential that he.fore 
any artinn ran he tal.:fn thr accusation must ht- specified in 
rhar::ictcr. Tn thf inc:tant rasc, the rc,.pondent rlirl not state 
that he ,.•,:as fnrmally Oispossfsc:rd. Thi'.". would he for some 
reason if actu<ll pnc:-.~ssion had hf'<'n delivered. He could not 
l--t- saicl to ht\\'{' c:omr to rourt with cl"an hands. Further, the 
fiPrlinl! nf tl~e Jlie'h C011rt that the appellants 
delivered 
no<::session l·onrstl,· hrlic\'in(! that tht-y \\'ere not hound not to 
do -.o in the ahc:rnc:r oi 11,~ nffir-ial r-omm11nic:ation meant that 
there: ,.,•as no rlrfiancr of thr l-fit"h f'.nurt's order. There conlrl 
he no \\'ilful 
cHsohedienc~ sinc:t:> th,.re \vac; no helicf in the 
cxic;ff'nc:e of the ordrr. 
It mav nnt he ncc:es<:.arv that the party against l\·hom a 
p'"ohihitorv order ,.,·a<:. m:v1f" must he sr.r\'c<l "·ith the order, but 
it sl·oulO Pa''(' noticr nf the nrdt"r tr.for,. it could be cxpt'Ctf"rl 
to nl·t"Y .. Such noticr mn~t h,- from sourct-o; connected v.:ith 
the court 
p;i~<;inrr thr o

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