HIRALAL PATNI versus LOONKARAM SETHIYA & OTHERS

Citation: [1962] 1 S.C.R. 868 · Decided: 11-04-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

868 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1962) 
r96r 
under the Export Promotion Scheme and still the 
Gia" Chatons State Trading Corporation had been :preferred it would 
Importm & 
perhaps have been necessary to consH,ler whether the 
Usm' A"ociation preference accorded to the Corporation was based on 
v. 
reasonable and rational grounds. It is clear however 
Union of India that though it was open to these petitioners to apply 
for licenqes uuder the Export Promotion Scheme they 
Das Gupta J. made no application for licence thereunder. There is 
no scope therefore for the argument that they have 
been discriminated against. 
April II· 
In the result, we are of opinion that the petitioners 
are not entitled to any relief under Art. 32 of the Con-
stitution. The petition is accordingly dismissed with 
costs. 
Petition dismissed. 
HIRALAL PATNI 
v. 
LOONKARAM SETHIYA & OTHERS 
(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and 
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Civil Procedure-Receiver, continued by preliminary decree 
till discharged-Final decree silent-Whether receiver automatically 
discharged-Lease by reuiver to party-Term of leas. expiring-
Dispossession o/ lessee by receiver-,Summary procedure or civil 
suit-Code of Civil Procedure, I9D8 (V of 1908), 0. 40. 
The John Mills comprising of three textile mills and one 
flour mill were jointly owned by several persons. The financier 
of the Mills filed a snit for recovery of the amount due to him. 
During the pendency of the suit a receiver was appointed to 
take possession of the flour mills but he was not empowered to 
run the mi!ls directly without further directions of the court. 
A preliminary decree was passed in the suit directing among 
other things that the receiver was to continue until discharged. 
Thereafter, an arrangement was made for running the mills and 
the court directed that the appellant, who was one of the co-
owners of the mills, he given a lease of the flour mill for three 
years by the receiver. In the lease deed the appellant under-
took to deliver back possession to the receiver upon the expiry 
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
869 
of the three years. Shortly thereafter, a final decree was passed 
in the suit but it was silent in regard to the receiver appointed 
•earlier. On the expiry of the three year term of the lease the 
court directed the receiver to take back possession of the flour 
mill from the appellant. The appellant contended (i) that after 
the passing of the final decree the receiver ceased to '.be a 
receiver in respect of the rights of the co-owners and could not 
dispossess the appellant, and (ii) that the appellant could only 
be dispossessed by a suit filed by the receiver and not by a 
summary procedure. 
Held, that the receiver continued by the preliminary decree 
was entitled to function till he was discharged. The legal posi-
tion with regard to the continuance of receivers is that: (i) if a 
receiver is appointed in a suit until judgment, the appointment 
is brought to an end by the judgment in the suit; (ii) if a recei-
ver is appointed in a suit without his tenure being expressly 
defined, he will continue till he is discharged; (iii) even after 
the final disposal of the suit, though as between the parties to 
the suit his functions are usually terminated, the receiver con-
tinues to be answerable to the court till he is finally discharged, 
and (iv) the court has ample power to continue the receiver 
even after the final decree if the exigencies of the case so 
require. The final decree in the present case did not finally 
dispose of the suit and did not bring the appointment of the 
receiver to an end. 
Held, further that the court was entitled to direct the 
appellant to give back possession of the flour mill to the recei-
ver. The court was merely making suitable arrangement for 
the running of the mill in the course of its administration of the 
estate through the receiver. The mill had been leased out to the 
appellant with an express condition that he should redeliver 
the property to the receiver on the expiry of the lease and the 
court was competent under 0. 40 r. I(r)(d) Code of Civil Pro-
cedure to confer a power on the receiver ,to recover the pro~ 
perty from the appellant. It was not necessary for the receiver 
to file a suit for the recovery of the property. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Civil Appeal No. 
llO of 1961. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and 
order dated October 14, 1960, of the Allahaba

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