HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. versus KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA AND ORS.

Citation: [2016] 9 S.C.R. 515 · Decided: 06-10-2016 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KURIAN JOSEPH · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

[2016] 9 S.C.R. 515 
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. 
v. 
KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA AND ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. I 0084 of2016) 
OCTOBER 06, 2016 
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.) 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - s. 
2(q) and its proviso - Constitutional validity of s. 2(q) - Held; The 
object of the Act is to provide various remedies to women who suffer 
from domestic violence - Preamble of the Act also makes it clear 
that the Act is to redress violence, whether physical, sexual, verbal, 
emotional or economic - The definition of 'respondent' in s.2(q) is 
not based on any intelligible dijferentia having any rational relation 
to the object sought to be achieved by the Act - The microscopic 
difference between male and female, adult and non adult, regard 
being had to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, ·is neither 
real nor substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the 
object of the legislation - Rather the words 'adult male person' are 
contrary to the object - Therefore, the words, 'adult male' before 
the word 'person' in s., 2 (q) are struck down as these words 
discriminate between persons similarly situated and being contrary 
to the object to be achieved by the Act ...:. Applying the principle of 
severability, on striking down the expression 'adult male', the rest 
of the Section is left intact and can be enforced to achieve the object 
of the legislation without the offending words - The proviso to s.2(q) . 
has been provided only to carve out an exception to a situation .of 
'respondent' not being an 'adult male',... Once 'adult male' is struck 
down, the proviso has no independent existence, having been 
rendered otiose - Constitution of India - Art. · 14 - Doctrine of 
severability. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. A cursory reading of the statement of objects 
and rea-sons makes it clear that the phenomenon of domestic 
violence against women is widely prevalent and needs redressal. 
Whereas crimhJal law does offer sQme redressal, civil law does 
515 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
.'•, 
·a 
H 
516 
A 
B 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2016] 9 S.C.R. 
not address this phenomenon in its entirety. The idea therefore 
is to provide various innovative remedies in favour of women 
who suffer from domestic vio-lence, against the perpetrators of 
such violence. (Para 14][532-E-F] 
Re: Special Courts Bill (1979) 2 SCR 476 - followed. 
Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India (1990) 2 
SCR 441; Harbilas Rai Bansal '" State of Punjab 1995 
(6) Suppl. SCR 178 : (1996) 1 SCC 1 - relied on. 
2. The preamble of the statute is again significant. The 2005 
Act is to provide for effective protection of the rights of women 
C who are victims of violence of anv kind occurring within the family. 
The preamble also makes it clear that the reach of the Act is that 
violence, whether physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic, 
are all to be redressed by the statute. That the perpetrators and 
abettors of such violence can, in given situations, be women 
D themselves, is obvious. (Para 16)(532,-H; 533-A] 
E 
F 
G 
H 
3. The definition of "domestic relationship" contained in 
Section 2(f) is a very wide one. It is a relationship between 
persons who live or have lived together in a shared household 
and are related in any one of four ways - blood, marriage or a 
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or family 
members of a joint family. A reading of these definitions makes it 
clear that domestic relationships involve persons belonging to 
both sexes and includes persons related by blood or marriage. 
This necessarily brings within such domestic relationships male 
as well as female in-laws, quite apart from male and female 
members of a family related by blood. [Para 18][540-D-F] 
4. Equally, a shared household includes a household which 
belongs to a joint family of which the respondent is a member. 
Even before the 2005 Act was brought into force on 26.10.2006, 
Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was amended, with effect 
from 9.9.2005, to make females coparceners of a joint Hindu 
family and so have a right by bil·th in the property of such joint 
family. This being the case, whe1; a member of a joint Hindu 
family will now include a female co1larcener as well, the restricted 
definition contained in Section '.t(q) has necessarily to be given a 
relook, given that the definition of 'shared household' in Section 
HIRAL P. HARSORA AND ORS. v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS 
HAR

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.