HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD versus YASHWANT GAJANAN JOSHI AND ORS.
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HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
v.
YASHWANT G
0AJANAN JOSHI AND ORS.
DECEMBER 5, 1990
[S. RANGANATHAN, N.M. KASLIWAL AND
S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.]
Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User In
Land) Act, 1962-Sections 2(a), 7 to 10--'Competent Authoricy'
employee of contesting parties-Whether fit for appointment-Whether
violative of principles of natural justice.
The appellant corporation took steps under the Petroleum and
Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User in land) Act, 1962 for
laying down pipelines for a project called the Bombay-Pone Pipeline
Project. One Mrs. A.R. Gadre, Special Land Officer in the office of
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Competent Authority was appointed as competent authority by the
Government of India. One of the duties of the Competent Authority was
to determine the compensation which would be payable to those whose
proprietary rights were affected by laying down of pipes by the
Corporation.
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The respondent who was claiming compensation filed a petition in
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
appointment of Mrs. Gadre as competent authority on the ground that
the principles of natural jnstice required a feeling in both the parties
that justice would be done as between them. The High Court allowed
the writ petition and directed the Union of India to appoint another
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competent authority who shall not be an employee of the corporation.
Two special leave petition~ were tiled agaillst the judgment of lhe
High Court, one by the Corporation and the other by the Union of
India.
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Before this Court it was contended that the special leave petition
filed by the Union of India was barred hy limitation, and that the
special leave petition filed hy the Corporation was not maintainable,
specially when the special leave petition filed by the Union of India
stood dismissed, because Union of India alone was the interested party.
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On merits it was contended that (i) there was no question Of the
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H.P. CORPN. v. Y.G. JOSHI
435
violation of any principle of natural justice nor there WaS any question A
of bias in case any employee of the corporation was appointed as com-
petent authority under the Act; (ii) that there was no perslinai interest
of the Competent Authurlty in the subject matter of the litigation;
. namely in the determination of compensation, and as such the printiple
that no person could be a judge In his own cause was not applicable li1
the present case; (iii) determination of compensation by the Competent
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Authority in the first Instance was purely an administrative act by
which the rights uf the parties were not determined by the competent
authority; and (iv) the provisions li1 this Act were analogous iO those
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which case the amount of
compensation payable by the Government was, li1 the first instance,
determihed by tbe Officer of the Government itself.
Ott behalf bf the respondent it was contended that (I) the deter-
llllnatlM of compensation by the competent authority was a quasi•
judicial act and not an administrative act; (ii) the persons or authorities
ap1>ointed under varioils other Acts were appoli1ted by virtue of theif
holding some office or post and their orders were appealable to the
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higher authorities; (iii) where a discretion was given to the Central
Government for appointing the competent authority, then such discre-
tion should nut he exercised by appointing a person or authority who
111ay he in tbe employment of the body or authority for whose benefit lhe
pipelines were laid; (iv) while determining the questiori of bias the test
was hot whether li1 fact bias had affected the judgment but the test E
always Was illld must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend
thnt ii bias might operate against him in the decisiott of the subject
111att~r lif the dispute.
Dismissing the appelii, this Court,
HELi): (1) In view of the fact that the High Court bad rembved
Mrs. Gadre from actli1g as competent authority on the ground that she
was fin employee of the corporation and further given direction that any
Suitable person be appointed as competent authority but not an
~mployee of the corporation, there was an independent cause of grie-
vance to the corporation, and therefore the special leave petition collld o
be fded by the corporation. [ 438D]
(2) No one shall be a judge li1 his own cause only means that he
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