HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPORATION LTD. versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
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- I, - 129 A HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPORATION LTD. v. STATE OF UTT AR PRADESH & ANR. July 28, 1981 [V.D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.[ U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948-Section 3A (2) and notifications issued thereunder- Scope of Interpretation-Words of common parlance used in a Sales Tax Act-How interpreted. Pursuant to a circular issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax that alumi- nium ingots only should be taxed at the lower rate and that all other items like rods 1 bars, rolled products, extrusion sections etc. should be taxed at higher rates as unclassified items, the Sales Tax Officer taxed aluminium ingots manufactured by the appellant at the lower rate; and treating the ren1aining products manufac- tured by them as unclassified items taxed them at the higher rate. The High Court, dismissing the appellant's writ petition impugning the assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer, held that while alun1inium ingots, wire bars and billets would fall in the category of "metals and alloys", rolled products prepared by rolJiog ingots and extrusions manufactured from billets were different commercial commodities from the ingots and billets and that they fell outside the category of "metals and alloys". The method of assessment n1ade by the Sales Tax Officer was, therefore, upheld. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court erred in holding that the rolled products and extrusions were new commercial commodi- ties, distinct from the aluminium ingots and biJiets from which they were prepared and that they represented the marketable form merely of ingots and billets. Dismissing the appeal, HELD: The expression 'metal' has been generally employed in the rele- vant notifications to refer to the metal in its primary sense i.e. in the form in B c D E F which it is marketable as a primary commodity. Subsequent forms evolved G from the primary form and constituting distinct commodities marketable as such must be regarded as new commercial commodities. In all the relevant notifications, therefore, the framers followed the scheme that one clause dealt with metal in its original saleable form and another separate clause dealt with fabricated forms in which it was saleable as a new commodity. Aluminium ingots and billets are saleable commodities as such in the n1arket. WhenΒ· such a noti- H fication refers to a metal it refers to the metal in the primary or original form in which it is saleable and not to any subsequently fabricated form. [133 H; 134 F] A B c D E F 130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 1 S.C.R. The word "all" occuring in "all kinds of minerals, ores, metals and alloys including sheets ... " in the notification cannot be interpreted to include even subsequently fabricated forms of the metal, for such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the scheme of the notifications. While broadly a metal in its primary form and a metal in its subsequently fabricated form may be said to. belong to the same genus, the distinction made between the two constitutes a dichotomy of direct significance to the controversy in the instant case. Ll35 B-C1 Having regard to the scheme followed in the framing of the notifications, the expression "including" does not enlarge the meaning of the word "metal". It must be understood in a conjunctive sense, as a substitute for Hand''. [134 H] Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan and Others v. The Stale of Punjab and Others [1967] 20 S.TC. 430 followed. Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnool [1960] 11 S. T.C. 827 and State of Madhya Bharat (now State of Madhya Pradesh) and Others. v. Hiralal [1966] 17 S.T.C. 313 distinguished. State of Tamil Nadu v Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 S.T.C. 319 and 325, & Maharaja Book Depot v. State of Gujarat [1979] 2 S.C.R. 138 referred to. State of Gujarat v. Shah Ve/jibhai Motichand, Lunawada [1969] 23 S.T.C. 288 not approved. A word describing a commodity in a sales tax statute should be interpreted according to its popular sense, the sense in which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. Words of everyday use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance. But what is relevant in the circumstances of the present case is the manner in which these and similar expressions have been employed by those who framed the relevant notifications and with the infere
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