LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
βš–οΈ Ask the AI about your situation:πŸš— Car AccidentπŸ’Ό Work / Job🏠 Housing / EvictionπŸ‘ͺ Family / DivorceπŸ“‹ Contract DisputeπŸ’° Money Owed

HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPORATION LTD. versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

Citation: [1982] 1 S.C.R. 129 · Decided: 28-07-1981 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.D. TULZAPURKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

-
I, 
-
129 
A 
HINDUSTAN ALUMINIUM CORPORATION LTD. 
v. 
STATE OF UTT AR PRADESH & ANR. 
July 28, 1981 
[V.D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.[ 
U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948-Section 3A (2) and notifications issued thereunder-
Scope of 
Interpretation-Words of common parlance used in a Sales Tax Act-How 
interpreted. 
Pursuant to a circular issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax that alumi-
nium ingots only should be taxed at the lower rate and that all other items like 
rods 1 bars, rolled products, extrusion sections etc. should be taxed at higher rates 
as unclassified items, the Sales Tax Officer taxed aluminium ingots manufactured 
by the appellant at the lower rate; and treating the ren1aining products manufac-
tured by them as unclassified items taxed them at the higher rate. 
The High Court, dismissing the appellant's writ petition impugning the 
assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer, held that while alun1inium ingots, wire 
bars and billets would fall in the category of "metals and alloys", rolled products 
prepared by rolJiog ingots and extrusions manufactured from billets were different 
commercial commodities from the ingots and billets and that they fell outside 
the category of "metals and alloys". The method of assessment n1ade by the 
Sales Tax Officer was, therefore, upheld. 
In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court erred in 
holding that the rolled products and extrusions were new commercial commodi-
ties, distinct from the aluminium ingots and biJiets from which they were 
prepared and that they represented the marketable form merely of ingots and 
billets. 
Dismissing the appeal, 
HELD: The expression 'metal' has been generally employed in the rele-
vant notifications to refer to the metal in its primary sense i.e. in the form in 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
which it is marketable as a primary commodity. Subsequent forms evolved 
G 
from the primary form and constituting distinct commodities marketable as 
such must be regarded as new commercial commodities. In all the relevant 
notifications, therefore, the framers followed the scheme that one clause dealt 
with metal in its original saleable form and another separate clause dealt with 
fabricated forms in which it was saleable as a new commodity. Aluminium ingots 
and billets are saleable commodities as such in the n1arket. 
WhenΒ· such a noti-
H 
fication refers to a metal it refers to the metal in the primary or original form in 
which it is saleable and not to any subsequently fabricated form. [133 H; 134 F] 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
130 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1982] 1 S.C.R. 
The word "all" occuring in "all kinds of minerals, ores, metals and alloys 
including sheets ... " in the notification cannot be interpreted to include even 
subsequently fabricated forms of the metal, for such an interpretation would be 
inconsistent with the scheme of the notifications. While broadly a metal in its 
primary form and a metal in its subsequently fabricated form may be said to. 
belong to the same genus, the distinction made between the two constitutes a 
dichotomy of direct significance to the controversy in the instant case. Ll35 B-C1 
Having regard to the scheme followed in the framing of the notifications, 
the expression "including" does not enlarge the meaning of the word "metal". 
It must be understood in a conjunctive sense, as a substitute for Hand''. [134 H] 
Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan and Others v. The Stale of Punjab and Others 
[1967] 20 S.TC. 430 followed. 
Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnool 
[1960] 11 S. T.C. 827 and State of Madhya Bharat (now State of Madhya Pradesh) 
and Others. v. Hiralal [1966] 17 S.T.C. 313 distinguished. 
State of Tamil Nadu v Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 S.T.C. 319 and 325, 
& Maharaja Book Depot v. State of Gujarat [1979] 2 S.C.R. 138 referred to. 
State of Gujarat v. Shah Ve/jibhai Motichand, Lunawada [1969] 23 S.T.C. 
288 not approved. 
A word describing a commodity in a sales tax statute should be interpreted 
according to its popular sense, the sense in which people conversant with the 
subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. Words of 
everyday use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as 
understood in common parlance. But what is relevant in the circumstances of 
the present case is the manner in which these and similar expressions have been 
employed by those who framed the relevant notifications and with the infere

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.