LexHIMAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD. versus FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS .
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• • • 235 HJ.MAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD. v. FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS . March 28, 1980 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.] Land Acquisition Act 1894 (I of 1894) Section 18(1) & Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1962 (31 of 1962) S<etion 7 Scope of. Land acquisition proceedings 'person interested' who is. ,,.fcquisitio11 for company before July 20, 1962-Po.rsession not vesting in government-acquisition not complete-Invalidity nor cured by Section 7 of amen· ding Act. The appellant a private company was carrying on the business of manufac- ture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles. In or about 1957 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes of the com- peny and the Government on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition .Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by another notification under section 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on January 25, 1960. The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as "public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd." The acquisition proceedings culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December II, 1961 a letter was written on behalf of the Government inlforming the owner of the acquired llllld that possession would be taken on or about tho 12th of January, 1962. The first respondent in his writ petition to the High Court, contended that , tho Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a '~nte company which could not be said to ho a public purpose under section 4 of the Act and prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings shoold bo quashed. A Single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea, allowed the writ petition and quashed tho land acquisition proceedings along with the notifica- tiOllS. The appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal, as it was not 'a person interest- ed' within the meaning of section 18(1) of the Act. In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant : (1) the Letten Patent Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not 'a person interested' and therefore had no locus standi to file an appeal, and (2) in view of the various amendments in the Land Acquisi- tion Act, 1894 particularly in sections 40 and 41 it could not be said that the acquisition under section 4 was ultra vlru Olf the Act. A B c D E F G H .A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPQRTS [1980] 3 S.C.R Dismissing the appeal, I HELD : 1 (i) The appellant was undoubtedly 'a person interested' as con- "t- templated by section 18(1) of the Act. 'Ihe ~gh Court committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on fthe ground that it had no locus • standi · to file an appeal before the Bench. [243F] (ii) The 'definition of 'a pemon interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusiVe definition and must be liberally coll8trued so as ~o embrace all persons· who may be directly or indirectly interested, either in the title tO the land or in the quantum of compensation. [240D] In the instant case, the lands were actually acquired for the pnrpose of the Company and once the land vested in the <(iovernment, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the Company under' the agreement entered into between the Company and tho Government. Thus it cannot be said that the Company had no claim or tide to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the Company had to pay tho cof1pensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of. compensation was fixed so that the Company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this pnrpose, the Company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantnrn of compen.ation. ~240E-F] (iii) The preponderance of judicial opinion seem,s to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for w~ose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agrume1
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