HER HIGHNESS MAHARANI SHANTIDEVI P. GAIKWAD versus SAVJIBHAI HARIBHAI PATEL AND ORS.

Citation: [2001] 2 S.C.R. 590 · Decided: 21-03-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.P. BHARUCHA

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
HER HIGHNESS MAHARANI SHANTIDEVI P. GAIKWAD 
v. 
~-~ 
SAVJIBHAI HARIBHAI PATEL AND ORS. 
MARCH, 21, 2001 
B 
[S.P. BHARUCHA, N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.] 
Specific Relief Act, 1963 : 
* 
Sections 14(1)(c) and (d)-Specific peiformance-Owner entered ir.to 
c 
an agreement with plaintiff for construction of dwelling units for weaker section 
of society-However, plaintiff was not put in possession of suit land-Agree-
ment was terminable before delivery of possession-Power of Attorney ex-
ecuted in favour of plaintiff-Plaintiff filed 5 schemes before competent author-
• ity-Subsequently, agreement and Power of Attorney cancelled-Under the 
revised Master Plan, suit land designated as openspace-Plaintifffiledsuitfor 
D 
declaration and specific peiformance of agreement-Trial coul1 decreed suit-
In appeal, High Coul1 modified the decree and held that plaintiff was entitled 
to enforce specific peiformance subject to final declaration under S.21 of 
Urban Land Ceiling Act-Competent authority issued final declaration-Valid-
ity of-Held: As there is no delivery of possession S.14(1)(c) applies and, 
E 
therefore, agreement cannot specifically be enforced-Fun her, if the peiform-
y 
ance of a contract cannot be continuously supervised by the co"ul1 such contract 
be specifically enforced in view of S.14( 1 )( d)-S.202 of Contract Act has no 
application-Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976-Contract Act, 
.. 
1872, S.202-Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954-Gujarat Town Planning and 
Urban Development Act, 1976. 
F 
Section 20-Specific peiformance-Decree-Grant of-Judicial Princi-
pies-Held: Grant of decree of specific peiformance is a matter of discretion-
~· 
Coun is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do sa-
But such discretion is to be exercised on sound and judicial principles and not 
G 
arbitrarily-Where it is inequitable to enforce specific peiformance, coul1 may 
decline to decree specific peiformance. 
The predecessor-in-interest (original defendant No. 1) of the appel-
lant entered into an agreement in respect or a portion of his property with 
~::' 
respondent No. 1 plaintiff for evolving a scheme for construction or 
H 
dwelling units (or the weaker sections of the society as envisaged hy 
590 
HER HIGHNESS MAHARANI SHANTIDEV! P. GAIKWAD v. S.H. PATEL 
591 
Section 21 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. However, 
A 
-~ 
respondent No. 1 was not put in possession ?f the suit property. Clause 17 
of the agreement stipulated that before delivery of possession of the 
property in question, the contract could be unilaterally terminated. An 
irrevocable Power of Attorney was also executed in favour of respondent 
No. 1 ·plaintiff. Five schemes under S.21 of the Act were filed before the 
B 
competent authority for construction of dwelling units. Soon after the 
submission of the third scheme original defendant No. 1 executed an 
affidavit-cum-declaration. Subsequently, the original defendant No. 1 can-
celled the agreement and Power of Attorney. 
Being aggrieved, respondent No. 1-plaintiff filed a suit against origi· c 
nal defendant No. 1 seeking declaration that cancellation of the agree· 
ment and the Power of Attorney were illegal and also praying for decree of 
specific performance of the agreement. The trial court decreed the suit. In 
appeal, the High Court modified the decree and held that respondent No. 
1 was entitled to enforce the specific performance subject to final declara· 
D 
tion under Section 21 of the Act. Accordingly the competent authority 
made a declaration under Section 21 of the Act. During the pendency of 
this appeal the Act had been repealed. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that under the applicable 
Master Plan the suit land was reserved for 'open space' and residential 
E 
.. 
houses could not be constructed thereupon and, therefore, the agreement 
was incapable of specific performance. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD : 1.1. In the present case, in the draft development plan which 
F 
was finalised during the pendency of the suit, the land in question is 
reserved for open space etc. It cannot be doubted that the agreementhad 
been entered into between the parties mainly and rather only with the 
object of construction of residential houses under the scheme under Sec· 
tion 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 for accom· 
G 
modation of the weaker sections of the society. Later on it became evident

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.