LexHASMUKHALAL DAHAYABHAI & ORS. ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF GUJARAT
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HASMUKHALAL DAHA YABHAI & ORS. ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF GUJARAT August 4, 1976 [A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] 103 Constitution of India-Article 31A(l) Second Proviso-Art. 31B-Meaning of right conferred-9th Schedule-Whether different ceiling Qin be imposed for different persons-Whetlwr second proviso to A rt. 3 lA ( 1) imposes o fetter on 1/ie legislative competence-Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act 1961 (Gujarat Act 27 of 1961)-S'ection 2(21), 6. General Clauses Act 1897-Section 3(42)-Meaning of person-Whether legislature bound to follow definition in General Clauses Act. The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Agricul- turnl Land Ceiling Act 1961 by filing writ petitions i1~ the High Court of Gujarat. The Preamble of the Act state, that the Act was enacted for secur- ing the distribution of agricultural land as best to sub-serve the common good. Section 6( I) of the Act provides that no person shall hold either as owner or tenant lahd in excess of the ceiling area. section 6(2) provides that where an individual who holds land as a member of a family, not being a joint family, then the spouse and the children excluding major sons shall be grouped together for the purposes of the Act and the provisions of the Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person. The ceiling area is fixed depending on the classes of land, hature of irriga~ion facilities and productivity. The said statute has been put in the 9th Schedule by the Parliament. The Gujarat ·Highi Court dism,issed the writ petitioM filed by the appellants ·but granted certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (l) of the Constitution to the appellaht. The appellants contended that (1) Second proviso to Art. 3 1 A of the Constitution provides that where, any law makes provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate, which is held by a pe,rson under his personal cultiva-' tion, it shall hot be lawful for the State to, acquire any portion of such Jand as is within the cejling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force unless the law provides for payment of compensation at a rate which is not Jess than the market value. Apart from variations in the, ceiling area imposed by a statute, there cannot be a deprivation of rights of indivi- duals holding property separately in exercise of their separate individual rights by grouping them as members of one family. (2) The concept of "person" adopted by the !llatute is unnatural and legally untenable. The concept of the' term 'person' having been fixed by the, Cehtral General Clause Act, this concept and no other must be used for interpreting ~econd proviso to Art. 3 IA of the Constitution. (3) The second proviso to Art. 31A(l) does hot confer any right upon any person but onlY. imposes a limit upon legislative competence so that the inclusion of the Act in the 9th Schedule will not validate a provi~ion which the Legislature was not competent at all to enact. HELD : The term 'person' is not defihed in the Act. Section 2(2 l) mere\¥ states that person includes a joint family. Under s. 3(42) of the General Clause• Act 1897, a person is defined as' including: any company or association Gr body of individuals whether incorporated or hot. In the absence of s. 6(2) each individual member of a family would have been entitled to hold land upto the ceiling limit if it was his or her ]ef!ally separate property. The Act does not debar spouses and minor children from holding their separate. rights to land. There is, no fixed concept of 'person' ahy where. Section 6(2) does aot eit!Ier disable .a husband or a wife from holding their separate proPerties separately. It does not merge or destroy their separate legal persona1ities. It A B c D E F G H A B c D E F 104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1. S.C.R. merely requires their separate holdings to be grouped together as through they w1rre held by one person only for the. purpose of determini"ng the ceiling Jim, .. Each holder of such, separate rights above the ceiling limit is permitted to select the property he or she wish<;s to continue \O hold in such a way that · the lands selected for such continuance shall be in the same praportion in which lands were held by each spouse. The reduction in their holdinl!I will, therefore, be proportionate to the areas' of lands held separately. Bu
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