LexHARU DAS GUPTA versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL
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HARU DAS GUPTA
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
February 1, 1972
[J.M. SHBLAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.J
West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, (Presidenfs A·ct
19 of 1970), ss. 12 and 13-Period of three months from the date of
detention-Method of computation.
The petitioner was arrested and detained on February 5, 1971 under
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s. 3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970.
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After receipt of the report of the Advisory Board, the St>te Government
confirmed the detention order on May 5, 1971.
On the question whether the c"'1firmation was made one day after the
expiration of the period of 3 months from the date of detention.
HELD : The
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effect ol defining a period from such a day until such
a day within which an '1Ct is to he done is to exclude the first day and
to include the last day; and tberefdre, in the present case, the order of
confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months.
from the date of detention. [331 E-FJ
Young v. Higgon, 6 M & W 50 = 151 E.R. (Ex.) 317, RadcliDe v •.
Bartholomew, [1892) 1 Q.B. 161. Williams v.
Burges 10 L.J.O.B.
10,
Hardy v. Rlye, 9 B & C 603, English v. CliD, [1914) 2 Ch. 376, Goldsmiths'·
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Co. v. West Metropolitan Rly. Co. [1904] 1 K.B. 1, S, Cartwright v.
MacCormac, [1963] 1 All E.R. U; 13, Marren v. Dawson Bentley cl CO.:
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Ltd., [1961) 2 Q.B. 135, Stewart v. Chanman, U951) 2 K.B. 792, In re: .
North, Ex parte Hasluck, ,H895] 2 Q.B. 264 and Halsbury's Laws of Eng-·
land 3rd ed. Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95) refererd to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 287 of 1971 ..
Under article 32 .of the Constitution of India for a writ in the,
nature or habeas corpus.
N. N. Goswami, for the petitioner.
D, N. Mukherjee, Sukumar Basu and G. S. Chatterjee, for the
respondent.
The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by
Shelat, J.
The petitioner was arrested and detained on
February 5, 1971 in pursuance of an order of detention passed on
that very day by the Qistrict Magistrate, 24 Parganas under sec.
3(1) and (3) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities)·
Act, President's Act 19 of 1970.
There is no dispute that, as required by !he Act, his case was:
referred to the Advisory Board and on receii>t of its rep<>.\'t that
330.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
there was sufficient cause for his detention, the State Government
under sec. 12 of the ~ct made an order or decision confirming
the said deten1ion order and continuing his detenion thereunder.
The order of confirmation and continuation was made on May
5, 1971.
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The only contention raised in this petition was that the order
or decision of confirmation of the said detention order was made
one day after the explra11ion of the period of three months from
the date of detention, that the said period of three months would
end on the midnight of May 4, 1971, and that any confirmation
.. and continuation of detention made othereaher would not oo valid.
The question is when can 1ihe period of three months from
the date of detention be saic\ to have expired. . When a period
of tiine running from a given day or event to another day or event
is prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the qiiestion arises
whether the computaticin is to be made inclusively or exclusively
of the first-mentiQned Qr of the last-mentioned day, regard must
be had to the context and to the purpose for which the computa-
. tion has to be made.
(Halsbury's Laws of Eng/and, (3rd. ed.)
vol 37, p. 92).
There is, however, a volume of authority in
England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within
a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is
to be excluded from computation and the day on which such action
is taken is to be included. As early as 1840, Parke, B. laid down
this rule in Young v. Higgon('). In Radc(ifje v. Bartholomew(2 ),
Wills, J., relying on Williams v. Burgess(') and Hardy v. Ryle('),
held that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Act, filed on June 30, in respedt of an act alleged to have been
committed on May 30, was "within one calendar monllh after
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the cause of such complaint shall arise". He held so on the principle
that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to ·F
be excluded while computing the period within which under the ·
Act othe complaint had to be filed. In Williams v. Burgess,( 8 ) the
staJtute directed waExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.