LexHARSHAD S. MEHTA AND ORS. versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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..... HARSHAD S. MEHTA AND ORS. A v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA SEPTEMBER 6, 200 I .B [S.P. BHARUCHA, Y.K. SABHARWAL AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992-Sections 6.7,9(2) and (4), 13--Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- C Sections 6, 157, 306, 307, and 308-Power of Special Court to grant pardon--' Held, is a substantive power and not an inherent power-Power to Special Court not denied either expressly or impliedly under the Act-All proceedings relating to offences under the Act is committed before the Special Court and not before criminal courts constituted under Cr PC-Special Court has all the D powers available to a criminal court-Hence, Special Court has power to grant pardon at any stage of the proceedings. Interpretation of Statutes: Doctrine of implied repeal-Applicability of-Held, there in no E inconsistency between the provisions of Cr PC and the Act-Hence, the doctrine is not applicable. Harmonious Construction-Held, the provisions of the Act and the Cr Pc must be harmoniously construed without causing any confasion or resulting in absurd consequences. Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating for F Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992--Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Accused P and C filed applications before the Special Court set up under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 for grant _of pardon. The applications were supported by Central Bureau of Investigation with a view to obtain evidence. The accused earlier G made statements under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 before a Magistrate. The Special Court granted conditional pardon to the accused. Appellants filed applications before the Special Court seeking revocation of the pardon granted to the accused on the ground·that the Special Court had no such power under the Act. The applications were dismissed by H 577 578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A the Special Court. In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the order of the Special Court granting pardon is without jurisdiction; that the power to grant pardon is not inherent power but a substantive power which is not conferred specifically under the Act; that the power the grant pardon contain in sections B 306 and 307 CrPC is not applicable to the proceedings before the Special Court constituted under the Act; that the Legislature deliberately never intended to confer the power on the Special Court under the Act and which was specifically conferred under similar earlier enactments like Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (since repealed) and the Special Courts Act, 1979; C that section 307 CrPC is not applicable since no commitment of the case is made to the Special Court; that at pre-cognizance stage_, no power of any nature has been conferred to the Special Court under the Act; that it is only that court of original jurisdiction, on which special power of pardon is conferred, can exercise such power; that the Special Court will have the power to grant pardon only after commitment of the case; that the power is not D available during investigation of the offence; and that the power contained in section 308 CrPC to punish the accused for violation of the terms and conditions of the pardon has not been conferred to the Special Court. The appellants further contended, the provisions of the Act, which is a later enactment, impliedly repeals the earlier enactment i.e. CrPC in E accordance with the max·im leges posteriores priores contertrios abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier laws); and that the presumption against the implied repeal stands rebutted as the provisions of the Act are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Acts and that the two cannot stand together. F G The respondent-State contended that the earlier enactments referred to by the appellants are only an external aid for interpretation of the provisions of the Act; that the scheme of the enactments and the present Act is entirely different and that the omission of power of granting pardon in the Act does not mean that the Legislature never intended to confer the power. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Penal laws require that punishment shall be inflicted on every person found guilty of an offence under those laws. The grant of pardon result
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