HARNAM versus STATE OF U.P.
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0 Ill 274 HARN AM v. STATE OF U.P. October IO, 1975 [P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] Penal Code-Murder-Sentence to be imposed-Life imprisonme1β’~ Capital. punishment-When could be imposed. The legislative history in regard to the subject of Β·~apital punishment shows tha.t there has been a significant change in thinking and approach since India became free. Prior to the amendment of s. 367(5) of the Code of Crimmal Procedure by Act 26 of 1955, the normal rule was to impose sentence of death on a person convicted for murder and if a lesser sentence was to be imposed, the Court was required to record reasons in writing. But by Act 26 of 1955, this provision in s. 367 (5) was omitted with the result that the Court became free to award either death sentence or life imprisonment, and no longer was death sentence the rule and life imprisonm~nt the exception. Then again a further progress was made in the same direction by s. 354 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. That section provides that when the convic- tion is for an offence punishable with death or in the alternative with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded. and, in the case of senten~e of death, the special reasons for such sentence. The unmistakable shift in the legislative emphasis is that for murder, life. imprisonment should be the rule and capital punishment the exception to be resorted to only for special redsons. lt is only where, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, there are spe~ial reasons that the death sentence may be awarded : otherwise life sentence offence would certinly be "too young." [277G; E, Fl The seminal trends in current sociological thinking and penal strategy, tempered as they are by humanistic attitude and deep concern for the worth of the human person, frown upon death penalty and regard it as cruel a11d savage punishment to be inflicted only in exceptional cases. [276G] In the instant case the appellant was charged with an offence of murder by severing the head of the de~eased from the body and then carrying it away in a most brutal and inhuman manner. The trial conrt convicted and sentenced him to death. Both the conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. Β· On the question of sentence, Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD : The appellant was just around 16 years of age at the time when he committed the offence and, therefore, he would be entitled to the clemency of penal justice. It would not be appropriate to impose the extreme penalty of death. Taking into account the current sociological and juristic thinking as could be seen from the recommendation of the Law Commission which appears to have been incorporated in the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill. J 972, it would be legitimate for the Court to refuse to impose death sentence on an accused convicted of murder, if it finds that at the ~ime of the commission of the offence the appellant was under 18 years of age. A murderer who is below 18 years of a.ge at the time of commission of the offence would certainly be "too young." [277G; E, Fl E. Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 799, followed. . ._,. "' Β·; -- HARNAM v. U.P. STATE (Bhagwati, J.) 275 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 1974. Appeal by Special Leave from Β·the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd February, 1974 of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No, 498 of 1973 and Capital Sentence No. 13 of 1973. A. N. MuUa and N. S. Das Behal for the appellant. 0. P. Rana for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is limited only to the question of sentence. The appellant has been sentenced l:o death for an offence under s. 302 of the Penal Code. The question is : Should the extreme penalty of death be commuted to one of life imprisonment ? To answer the question it is necessary to state a few facts. The appellant and a few others were tried in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Unnao for offences under s. 148 and s. Β·302 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge, on an appreciation of the evidence, found that the appellant, Sheo Dayal, Mihi Lal, Dularey and Mewa Lal had formed an unlaw- ful assembly and in pursuance of its common object, the appellant had intentio
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