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HARKESH CHAND versus KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.

Citation: [2017] 2 S.C.R. 285 · Decided: 13-02-2017 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.A. BOBDE

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2017] 2 S.C.R. 285 
HARKESH CHAND 
v. 
KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 1778 of2010) 
FEBRUARY 13, 2017 
[S. A. BOBDE AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.] 
Rent Control and Eviction - Notice for termination of tenancy 
of shop - Vis. 106 of Transfer of Property Act - Issued in September 
1972 - Suit for eviction filed in October 1972 - Dismissed by trial 
court on the ground that tenancy was protected by United Provinces 
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 - Order of'ยทยท .. 
trial court confirmed by Revisional Court - In writ petition High 
Court held that on 15th July 1972 the 1947 Act was repealed and 
the special notification [under new Act i.e. Uttar Pradesh Urban 
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972} 
covering the area in question was issued on 23"1 January 1973, 
thus there was no protection of tenancy between 15'' July 1972 and 
23"1 January 1973 and hence the notice terminating the tenancy 
was valid - On appeal, held: The 1947 Act was made applicable to 
the area in question by notification dated 31" March 1949 - By 
virtue of s. 24 of Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act,ยท 1904, the 
notification dated 31" March 1949 continued to exist even after 
the 1947 Act was repealed upon reenactment of the 1972 Act -
Hence, the suit is untenable - However, in the facts and 
circumstances of the case as well as in the interest of justice, tenant 
directed to hand-over the possession of the premises in question to 
the land-lord after a period of three years. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD 1. It is clear from sub-section (2) of s. 1 of United 
Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, 
that it extended to the whole of the erstwhile United Provinces 
and applied to every municipal area, cantonment area and notified 
area as per the provincial Government Notification in the official 
gazette. Undisputedly, the Governor declared that the provisions 
of Section 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 16 of the 1947 Act shall 
285 
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286 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 
apply to the area in question by a Notification dated 31" March, 
1949. [Para 14] [292-B-C] 
2.1 A plain reading of s. 24 of Uttar Pradesh General 
Clauses Act, 1904 suggests that any statutory instrument (which 
a notification is) issued under the repealed enactment continues 
in force as if it were issued under the re-enacted provisions to 
the extent that it is not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions. 
Such continuance exists till the statutory instrument is superseded 
by a statutory instrument issued under the re-enacted provisions. 
[Para 16] [292-G-H; 293-A] 
2.2 Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings 
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provided 
the same restrictions on the eviction of tenants on specified 
grounds that Section 3 (a) of the 1947 Act did. Thus, there is no 
inconsistency whats()~ver found between the two provisions. 
There is also no express provision to the contrary in the 
subsequent enactment i.e. 1972 Act. [Para 19] [293-E-F] 
2.3 The provisions of an Act, and a conditional legislation 
such as a notification, belong to a different order of things. A 
statutory instrument (i.e. the notification) itself does not enact 
the protection to the tenants. The Act of 1947 does that. The 
notification merely makes the enactment applicable to the area 
in question. Apparently the purpose of the re-enacted provision 
is, inter alia, to protect the tenants from eviction, except on special 
grounds. Nothing in t,he 1972 Act shows that such a protection 
was intended to be removed from any area or for that matter, the 
area in question. In fact, the contrary is clear from the fact that a 
notification expressly applying the re-enacted provisions to the 
area in question was issued on the 21" of March, 1973. Thus, 
there can be no inconsistency between the notification applying 
the 1947 Act to the area in question and the re-enacted provisions 
of the Act unless the Act of 1972 clearly expresses an intention 
to remove the protection accorded to the tenants from an area. 
[Para 20] [293-F-H; 294-A-B] 
2.4 None of the conditions which derogate from the 
continuation of the notification exist in the present case. There 
is no express provision to the contrary, there is no supersession 
HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS. 
by any statutory instrument under the re-enacted provisions and 
the

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