HARKESH CHAND versus KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.
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[2017] 2 S.C.R. 285 HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 1778 of2010) FEBRUARY 13, 2017 [S. A. BOBDE AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.] Rent Control and Eviction - Notice for termination of tenancy of shop - Vis. 106 of Transfer of Property Act - Issued in September 1972 - Suit for eviction filed in October 1972 - Dismissed by trial court on the ground that tenancy was protected by United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 - Order of'ยทยท .. trial court confirmed by Revisional Court - In writ petition High Court held that on 15th July 1972 the 1947 Act was repealed and the special notification [under new Act i.e. Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972} covering the area in question was issued on 23"1 January 1973, thus there was no protection of tenancy between 15'' July 1972 and 23"1 January 1973 and hence the notice terminating the tenancy was valid - On appeal, held: The 1947 Act was made applicable to the area in question by notification dated 31" March 1949 - By virtue of s. 24 of Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act,ยท 1904, the notification dated 31" March 1949 continued to exist even after the 1947 Act was repealed upon reenactment of the 1972 Act - Hence, the suit is untenable - However, in the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in the interest of justice, tenant directed to hand-over the possession of the premises in question to the land-lord after a period of three years. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD 1. It is clear from sub-section (2) of s. 1 of United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, that it extended to the whole of the erstwhile United Provinces and applied to every municipal area, cantonment area and notified area as per the provincial Government Notification in the official gazette. Undisputedly, the Governor declared that the provisions of Section 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 16 of the 1947 Act shall 285 A B c D E F G H 286 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R. apply to the area in question by a Notification dated 31" March, 1949. [Para 14] [292-B-C] 2.1 A plain reading of s. 24 of Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904 suggests that any statutory instrument (which a notification is) issued under the repealed enactment continues in force as if it were issued under the re-enacted provisions to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions. Such continuance exists till the statutory instrument is superseded by a statutory instrument issued under the re-enacted provisions. [Para 16] [292-G-H; 293-A] 2.2 Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provided the same restrictions on the eviction of tenants on specified grounds that Section 3 (a) of the 1947 Act did. Thus, there is no inconsistency whats()~ver found between the two provisions. There is also no express provision to the contrary in the subsequent enactment i.e. 1972 Act. [Para 19] [293-E-F] 2.3 The provisions of an Act, and a conditional legislation such as a notification, belong to a different order of things. A statutory instrument (i.e. the notification) itself does not enact the protection to the tenants. The Act of 1947 does that. The notification merely makes the enactment applicable to the area in question. Apparently the purpose of the re-enacted provision is, inter alia, to protect the tenants from eviction, except on special grounds. Nothing in t,he 1972 Act shows that such a protection was intended to be removed from any area or for that matter, the area in question. In fact, the contrary is clear from the fact that a notification expressly applying the re-enacted provisions to the area in question was issued on the 21" of March, 1973. Thus, there can be no inconsistency between the notification applying the 1947 Act to the area in question and the re-enacted provisions of the Act unless the Act of 1972 clearly expresses an intention to remove the protection accorded to the tenants from an area. [Para 20] [293-F-H; 294-A-B] 2.4 None of the conditions which derogate from the continuation of the notification exist in the present case. There is no express provision to the contrary, there is no supersession HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS. by any statutory instrument under the re-enacted provisions and the
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