LexHARJIT SINGH MANN versus S. UMRAO SINGH AND OTHERS
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• ' iOl HARJIT SINGH MANN A v. S. UMRAO SINGH AND OTHERS December 12, 1979 (P. N. SH!NGHAL AND E. S. VENKATARAM!AH, JJ.J Representation of the People Act, 1951 sections 33, 36(4) 'Defect of 3ub.r- 1anria/ Character'-Meaning of. The appellant was a voter in the Constituc:~cy from. which the Respondent was elected as a member of the State Legislative Assembly. His nomination paper was reiected by the Returning Officer on the ground that it was filed beyond the time prescribed for filing nomination papCr and that he had not made and subscribed an oath on it, as required by law. In his petition beore the High Court the appellant contended that ( 1 ) tht filing of nomination paper late by 1() minutes could not be a ground for i'cject- i.ng the nomination paper and it was not a defect of substantial character within the meaning of section 36(4) of the Act, (2) the allegation that be bad filed to make and subscribe the oath before the Returning Officer as required by Art. 173 of the Constitutionwas not true and (3) the respondent was guilty of cor- rupt practice of bribery. The High Court rejecting all the contentions, d~ mi.!Sed the petition. Ilismissini: the appeal, this court HELO : I (a) It is the requirement of law that the Returning Officer should mention the time of presentation of the nomination papers. The endorsement by the Returning Officer shows that the nomination paper was presented on May 18, 1977 at 15.10 by the proposer, and that the endorsement to that effect was duly signed by the Returning Officer. [504 E-F] (b) It is not correct to say that the delay in presentation of the nomination paper was not a ground for its rejection as it was not a defect of substantial character within the n1eaning of Section 36(4) of the Representation of Ui. People Act. In the face of the clear requirement of section 36(2)(b) of the c D E F Act. any other view would make the requirement for the presentation of th• nomination paper before the last date and within the specified period of time, unworkable for it will not then be possible to draw a line upto which the G delay in the delivery of the nomination paper! could be condoned. If the requirement of the law in that respect is not observed, and its breach is con· sidered to be a defect which was not of a substantial character it may be per- missible to go to the extent of arguing that the nomination paper may be filed even upto the date and time fixed for the scrutiny of the nominations. That would not only cause administrative inconvenience but put the other candidata to a serious disadvantage for they would not be able to prepare themselves for n any objection they may like to raise to the validity of the nomination, at tht time of ocrutiny of the nominatiolli. [505 H, 50~ A-CJ A B • ,, • 02 SUPl\l!MI COURT JlllPOllTS [1980} 2 s.c.R. (c) The requirement that the nomination papera •boll be delivered belwee1t tilo hours of eleven O'clock in the forenoon and three O'clock in tho aftern<>ff i1 mandatory and the Returning Officer ha. no option but to reject the nomina- tion paper •• required by Section 36(2) of tho Act. [505 G-H] (2) The trial court held that the oath or affirmation which was required to bo nade or sub.scribed by the candidate had not been made and subscribed at the time et the presentation of the noinination papers. As the appellant wu not able. t• ,roduce the certificate of his making and subscribing the oath or affirmatio• before the Returning Officer thereafter, in the manner alleged by him, there is aothing wrong with the view taten by the trial court that ho did not really do '°· [508 A-B, D-EJ (3) It i1 an essential ingredient of the definition of corrupt practice of C "bribery" that the gift, offer or promi.oe •hould be by the candidate or his agenl or by any other person with the coment of the candidate or his Election Agent. The trial court rightly took the view that it was necessary for the purpose of proving the corrupt practice of bribery to establish that there we an element M "bargaining" in what the rc11pondent was alleged to have done for twe villages. When the element of bargain was completely absent from the allega- (_ tion againat the respondent, the trial court was justified in holding that th• alleged corrup practice hid nol been e•tablahed. [809 G, 510 H, Sll A, D-EI E F G Ghrui Ram v. Dal Singll and othm [1968] 3 SCR 102, Amir Chand v. Sur<ndra Lal
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