LexHARJAS RAL MAKHIJA (D) THR. LRS. versus PUSHPARANI JAIN & ANR.
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[2017] l S.C.R. 1 HARJAS RAl MAKHIJA (D) THR. LRS. v. PUSHPARANI JAIN & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 11491 of2016) ' JANUARY 02, 2017 [MADAN B. LOKUR AND AD,\RSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.] Fraud - Suit alleging that the defendant had obtained decree A B in her favour fraudulently by non-disclosure of necessary and relevant facts or concealment of material facts - Held: A mere C concealment or non-disclosure without intent to deceive or a bald allegation of fraud without proof and intent to deceive would not render a decree as fraudulent - It is only after evidence is led, coupled with intent to deceive, that a conclusion of fraud could be arrived at - Fraud must be proved and not merely alleged or inferred - The plaintiff had an opportunity to prove allegation of fraud in D the previous suit, which he failed right upto Supreme Court - Even in the plaint of the present suit, the plaintiff has not made any specific a/legation of fraud having been played by the defendant while obtaining the decree - In the present case, fraud has only been alleged and not provej - Suit liable to be dismissed - Cost of E Rs.50, 0001- imposed. .~ Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. There is no doubt th~t a decree was passed in favour of respondent No.1 by the Distfict Judge on 4" October, 1999 after a full-fledged trial and thllt decree was upheld not only by the High Court but also by this Court. In that suit, the appellant had made an application before the High Court to produce additional evidence to suggest that the agreement for sale entered into by him with respondent No.1 through her attorney on 16" October, 1988 was genuine and based on the Power of Attorney given by her on 30'' April, 1983. Not only was the application for bringing on record addilional evidence dismissed by the High Court but the decree dismissing the suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale filed by the appellant was also dismissed by the High Court. That dismissal attain~d finality when the petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the appellant were 1 .--- F G H 2 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 1 S.C.R. dismissed by this Court. [Para IS) [6-G-H; 7-A) 2. Through a collateral attack, the appellant has now sought to deprive respondent No.I of her allotment of the suit property by alleging in the present suit that she had concealed the Power of Attorney executed by her on 30" April, I983 and had thereby committed a fraud on the courts. [Para I7] [7-C-D] 3. When there is an allegation of fraud by non-disclosure of necessary and relevant facts or concealment ,,; ::nateri;rl, facts, it must be inquired into. It is only after evidence is led, coupled with intent to deceive, that a conclusion of fraud could be ar.rived at. A mere concealment or non-disclosure without intent to deceive or a bald allegation of fraud without proof and intent to deceive would not render a decree obtained by a party as fraudulent. To conclude in a blanket manner that in every case where relevant facts are not disclosed, the decree obtained would be fraudulent, is stretching the principle to a vanishing point. [Para 21] [8-B-D] · A. V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. [2007) 3 SCR 603 : (2007) 4 SCC 22I; Union of India v. Ramesh Gandhi [2011] I6 SCR I26 : (2012) .I SCC 476 :- referred to. 4. Fraud has a definite meaning'in'law and it must be proved and not merely alleged and inferred. The appellant had an opportunity to prove the allegation of fraud when he had filed an application under Order XLI Rnle 27 of the CPC in the previous suit. However, he missed that opportunity right up t>o this court. He took a second shot at alleging fraud and filing another suit. In the plaint of the present suit, the appellant has nowhere made ·any specific allegation of a fraud having been played by respondent No.I on the trial court while obtaining the decree dated 4" October, I999. However, the evidence that he relied upon was very thin and could not even be considered as secondary evidence. Accordingly both the trial court as well as the High Court rejected the allegation of fraud by not accepting the evidence put forward by the appellant to allege that fraud had been committed by respondent No.I when she obtained the decree dated 4'' October, I999. Fraud was not proved but merely alleged. [Paras I8, 22, 23 and 24) [7-D; 8-E, F-G; 9-A-B) ' HARJAS RA! MAKHIJA (D) THR. LRS. v. PUSHP
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