HARISH CHANDRA BAJPAI versus TRILOKI SINGH

Citation: [1957] 1 S.C.R. 370 · Decided: 21-12-1956 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

1956 
A. M. Allison 
v. 
B. L. Stn 
Bhagwati]. 
Dtctmbtr 21 
370 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1957] 
of Assam. Proceedings by way of certiorari are "not 
of Course". 
(Vide Halsbury's 'Laws of England', 
Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, para. 1480 and 1481, pp. 
877-878). 
The High Court of Assam had the power 
to 
r~fuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was 
no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are 
directed against the orders of the High Court in 
applications under Art. 226, we could refuse to inter-
fere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case 
requires it. But we are not so satisfied. 
We are of 
opinion that, having regard to the merits which have 
been concurrently found in favour of the respondents 
both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the 
High Court, we should decline to interfere. 
This being the point of substance which has been 
decided in favour of the respondents, we are of the 
opinion that the appeals are liable to . be dismissed. 
We accordingly dismiss them but having regard 
to 
the particular circumstances which we have adverted 
to before, we order that each party will bear and pay 
its own costs of these appeals. 
Appeal dismiSJed. 
HARISH CHANDRA BAJPAI 
"· 
TRILOKI SINGH 
(BHAGWATI, 
VENKATARAMA 
AYYAR, 
B. 
P. 
SINHA 
and S. K. DAs JJ.) 
Election 
Dispute-Petition 
grounded 
on corrupt practices-
'Matter', if of_ wider 
import 
than 
'particulars'-'Trial', 
meaning 
of-'Procedure', if includeJ 
'powers'-Amendment, if 
and 
when 
permissible-Power of E'lection Tribunal-Person, when can be sai'd 
to be employed 
for 
purposes of election-Contract of service and 
contract for services-Di"sti'nction-Representation 
of the People Act 
(XL!// of 1951), ss. 81, 83, els. (1), (2) & (3), 90(2), 92, 123 els. 
(7) & (8)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), 0. VJ, r. 17. 
The rcspon<lent filed a petition under s. 81 of the 
Represen~ 
tation of the People Act challenging the election of the appellants 
1 to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative 
A~sembly on the ground that 
they 
had committed corrupt practices, 
the 
material allegations 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
371 
being, ( 1) that the 
appellant' "could in the furtherance of their 
election enlist the 
support of 
cetain 
Government 
servants", 
and (2) that the appellant No. 1 had employed two persons in 
excess of the prescribed number for his election purposes. 
No 
list of particulars of corrupt practices under s. 83(2) of the Act 
was attached to the petition. 
Thereafter the respondent applied 
under s. 83(3) of the Act for an amendment of his petition by 
adding the names of certain village Headmen (Mukhias) as having 
worked for the appellants and later on become their polling 
agents. 
The Election Tribunal allowed the amendment, when a 
fresh petition on those a'.legations would have been time-barred, 
holding that what were sought to be introduced by it were mere 
particulars of the charge already made, and held that corrupt 
practices under ss. 123(8) and 123(7) had been committed by the 
appellants. 
It accordingly declared the 
election 
void 
under 
s. 100(2) (b) of the Act. 
It was contended on behalf of the 
appellants that the Election Tribunal had no power either under 
s. 83(3) of the Act or under 0. VI, r. 17 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure to allow the amendment in question and its finding 
that the appellant No. 1 had employed the two persons in addition 
to the prescribed number was misconceived in law. 
' 
Held, that although the term 'matter' in s. 83(3) was of 
wider import than 'particulars' to be stated under s. 83(2) and 
would comprehend the grounds on which the election was sought 
to be set aside, s. 83(3) was not an exhaustive provision 
on the 
power of amendment, its application being limited to allegations 
of corrupt and illegal practice., and that, therefore, in respect of 
other matters, the power of amendment under 0. VI, r. 17, read 
with s. 90(2) of the Act was not excluded, and the maximum expressio 
unius exclusio alterius, would not apply. 
The word 'trial' in s. 90(2) of the Act is used in wide 
sense as including the entire proceedings before the 
Tribunal 
from the time when the petition is transferred to it under s. 86 of 
the Act till the pronouncement of its award. 
There is no antithesis between 'procedure' in s. 90(2) and 
'powers' in s. 92 of the Act and where an application would lie 
to the Tribunal under s. 90(2) it would have the power to pass the 
necessa

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