HARISH CHANDER & ORS. versus GHISA RAM AND ANR.

Citation: [1981] 2 S.C.R. 405 · Decided: 18-12-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.D. KOSHAL · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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HARISH CHANDER & ORS . 
v. 
QHISA MM, AND ANR. 
Decembu 18, 1980 
[A. D. Kosiw. AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.] 
Puniab Land Revenue Act, Section 44 and Rule I contained in Section 109 
Evidence Act-Scope of-Suit of pre-emption of land on the ground that the 
plai11tiff was a tenant-Presumption of truth of entries in favour of the revenue 
records like lamabandi and Khasra Girdawaris. 
Dismissing the defendant's appeal and affirming the decree in favour of tho 
plail)).iff, the Court. 
HELD : A presumption of truth attaches to the entries in the Jamabandi 
for the year 1959-60 showing the defendant-respondents as a tenant, in view of 
the provisions of Section 44 of the, Punjab Land Revenue Act. That presump-
tion is no doubt rebuttable, but, in the instant case, no attempt has been made 
to displace it. [407C-D] 
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Further, once that presumption is raised, still another comes. to the aid of 
respo_ndent No. 1 by reason of the rule contained iu Section 109 of the Indian 
Evidence Act, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stat;Ld to each 
other in the relatibnship of landlord and tenant. the burden of proving that such 
relationship has ceased, is on the party who so asserts. It may, therefore, be 
legitimately presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the land as a tenant 
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till the institution of the suit. [407D"E] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1970. 
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 
27-7-1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S. No. 737/ 
7P. 
,:.I 
Harbans Singh for th>~ Appellant. 
Hardayal Hardy and B. Datta, for the R,e1pondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
KOSHAL, J.-This appeal by special leave is dir~cted against the 
judgment dated July 27, 1970 of the High Court of Punjab and 
Haryana affinning the decrees passed by the trial court and the first 
appellate court in a suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the 
land in dispute in favour of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 on the ground 
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that he was a tenant of the disputed land when it was sold to the. 
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appellants by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 through a registered sale deed 
dated September 29, 1967. 
10-57 SCl/81 
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B 
c 
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406 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1981] 2 S.C.R. 
2. The suit was resisted by the appellants with the counter-claim 
that they, and not respondent No. 1, were in possession of the land 
on the relevant date as tenants inasmuch as it had been leased out 
to them by their vendor Kanti Prasad two years prior to the sale, 
i.e., in the year 1965. The decrees passed by the courts below proceed 
on the basis of evidence to the effect that the name of respoudent 
No. 1 was recorded as a tenant in the Jamabandi for the year 1959-60 
(Ex. P. 1) and consistently thereafter till the year 1968 
(Khasra-
girdawaris Bxs. P. 2 to P. 7). Apart from the oral evidence there 
is no material on the record which may indicate the falsity of any 
of the entries in the revenue records and we are of the opinion that 
the lower courts were fully justified in relying on them. 
Learned counsel for the appellants relies upon three documents 
in support of his contention that the Khasra-girdawaris should not 
be believed. 
First in point of time is an application 
(Ex. A31) 
which was sent to the concerned Deputy Commissioner through the 
military authorities by one of the appellants who was an army hand. 
That application is dated December 11, 1967 and states that the 
land in dispute was taken by him on lease from Kanti Prasad in the 
year 1965 and prays that the Khasra-girdawari should be corrected 
accordingly. 
The second is the sale-deed itself in which appears a 
recital to the effect that on the date of the sale the vendors had 
been in possession of the land covered by it for the preceding two 
years. 
The third is the plaint itself which seeks "possession by way 
of pre-emption". None of these documents is of any help to the case 
of the appellants. 
The recital in the plaint is easily explained. Il 
is no more than the usual prayer made in suits for pre-emption and 
may well be interpreted to mean that possession be granted !o the 
plaintiff by the decree in his capacity of a pre-emptor (and not that 
of a mere tenant) . It cannot be implied therefrom that the plaintiff 
was out of actual possession. In fact the case made out in the plaint 
was specifically founded on the plea that the plaintiff had been in 
possessio

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