HARI SINGH versus KANHAIYA LAL

Citation: [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 216 · Decided: 07-09-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AJAY PRAKASH MISRA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
HARI SINGH 
ll. 
KANHAIY A LAL 
SEPTEMBER 7, 1999 
B 
[AP. MISRA AND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 
Section 100-Second appeal-Substantial question of law-Existence 
C of-Eviction-8uit for-Lower Courts decreed suit on grounds of default, 
sub-letting and nuisance-High Court, in second appeal, without framing a 
substantial question of law, set aside the concurrent findings of facts of the 
Lower Courts-Held: The jurisdiction of High Court in second appeal is 
limited by Legislature-Hence, challenge in second appeal has to be confined 
D 
within limits under S. l 00-The purpose of amending S. l 00 by Amending Act 
of 1976 is based on public policy to bring finality to litigation at some point 
of time and to put limits on the jurisdiction of High Court under S. 100-
In the circumstances of the case. High Court erred in setting aside the 
concurrent findings of facts without framing a substantial question of law 
and by reappraisal of evidence-Further it is neither a case of no evidence 
E nor a perverse finding. 
Section 100 and Order 6 Rules 4 and 5-Second appeal-Pleading-
Lack of details in-Held: Cannot be a reason to set aside concurrent findings 
of fact-Details, if necessary, can be supplemented through evidence. 
p 
Sections 96 and 100-First appeal, second appeal or revision-Right 
G 
of-Held: Is neither natural nor inherent and is only to the extent conferred 
by Legislature. 
Legal Maxims: 
"Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium "-Meaning of 
The respondent-tenant took two shops and a godown on a certain 
monthly rent from the appellant-landlord. The appellant filed a suit for 
eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, sub-letting and nuisance. 
Within one week the appellant also filed another suit for fixation ofstandard 
H rent under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) 
216 
,. 
HARI SINGH v. KANHAIYA LAL 
217 
Act, 1950. The Trial Court fixed provisional standard rent at a higher rate A 
per month under Section 7 of the Act. The respondent deposited rent at the 
said higher rate for 10 months and thereafter defaulted. These facts were 
duly incorporated in the plaint by way of amendment The appellant pleaded 
that the respondent was also liable to be evicted on the ground of default in 
payment of the standard rent. 
The Trial Court struck out the defence of the respondent under Section 
13(5) on account of the respondent's failure to deposit provisional standard 
rent fixed under Section 7. The Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction by 
holding that the respondent committed default in payment of rent, had sub-
B 
let the premises and created nuisance. The Appellate Court upheld the C 
eviction on the ground of nuisance.and sub-letting but set aside the finding 
of default under Section 13(l)(a). 
The High Court in second appeal, without framing a substantial question 
of law, set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and directed 
restoration of possession to the respondent The High Court held that specific D 
details have not been incorporated in the pleading and that the Lower Court 
findings were contrary to the evidence on record. The finding of the Appellate 
Court of no default by the respondent was, however, not disturbed by the High 
Court. Hence this appeal. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that neither a substantial E 
question of law was framed nor did it arise in the case and, therefore, 
interference in second appeal by the High Court under Section 100 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 wa~ without jurisdiction. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
F 
HELD : 1. The jurisdiction of Courts in first appeals, second appeals 
or revisions is to the extent conferred by the Legislature. No litigant possesses 
any natural or inherent right to appeal against any order, unless a statute 
confers and it is to the extent it is conferred. Thus area to challenge is also 
hedged by the Legislature. Hence, challenge to the impugned order has to G 
be confined within such limitation. How Legislature limits such right could 
be visualised from Section 96 and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908 as it stood prior to the amendment by the Amendment Act 1976 (104 
of 1976) and as it stands after this amendment. [222-A-C] 
2. The purpose for amending Section 100 by the aforesaid Amending H 
218 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A Act was to further limit the jurisdiction of the High Court. Prio

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