HARENDRA NARAIN SINGH ETC versus STATE OF BIHAR

Citation: [1991] 3 S.C.R. 54 · Decided: 17-07-1991 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.N. SINGH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
HARENDRA NARAIN SINGH ETC. 
v. 
ST A TE OF BIHAR 
JULY 17, 1991 
[K.N. SINGH AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ) 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 3. Criminal Trial-Evidence 
-Circumstantial evidence-Nature and proof of-Conditions prece-
dent for conviction-Two views possible on circumstantial evidence-
One pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence-
Court should adopt latter-Circumstantial evidence-Onus of proof--
Prosecution must adduce its own evidence-It cannot rely on the 
absence of defence-Infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution cannot be 
cured by false explanation of accused. 
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 302 and 34 Murder-Convic-
D 
tion based on circumstantial evidence-Validity of. 
Appellants I and· 2, along with other co-accused, were prosecuted 
for the offence of murder. The entire evidence was circumstantial: (a) 
The murder was committed by Appellant-2 in the dispensary of the 
Appellant-I, a doctor, with his connivance; (b) the dead body was taken 
E 
out of the dispensary of the appellant-I am! the same was kept on an 
ekka and carried to a village Dibbi where it was placed in the courtyard 
of one of the co-accused; and (c) Recovery of the dead body from the 
courtyard of a co-accused. 
The Trial Court acquitted the accused from whose house the 
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dead body was recovered but convicted the remaining four accused for 
the offences under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal 
by the accused persons the High Court acquitted the other two co-
accused but upheld the conviction of the two appellants. Against their 
conviction, the appellants filed appeals in this Court, By an order dated 
3.5.199I, this Court allowed their appeals and set aside their conviction. 
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Giving reasons in support of its judgment, this Court, 
HELD: I. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that 
circumstantial evidence must be fully established from which there 
should be inevitable conclusion of the guilt of the accused beyond any 
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reasonable doubt and the facts so established should be consistent only 
54 
,. ..... 
l 
H.N. SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR 
55 
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, ruling out any hypothesis A 
of innocence of the accused. [588 I 
.., 
2. There is yet another basic rule of criminal jurisprudencethat if 
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case of circumstan-
tial evidence, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his 
innocence, the Court should adopt the latter view favourable to the 
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accused. [59C] 
3. The prosecution has to succeed on the basis of its own evi-
dence and it can not rely on the absence of' defence to sustain the 
guilt as there is no justification for raising such assumption against the 
appellants. [ 63B] 
Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [I952] 3 S.C.R. 
I09I;-Shivaji Saheb Rao Bobde & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, [I973] 
2 S.C.C. 793: [I974] I S.C.R. 489 aud Sharad B. Chand v. 
Maharashtra, [I985] I S.C.R. 88, referred to. 
4. In the instant case, there are glaring circumstances which are 
fatal to the prosecution case. The prosecution has produced eviderlct 
only to the effect that a dead body was taken out of the dispensary of 
Appellant-I by Appellant-2 and other accused persons and the same 
c 
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was carried on the ekka to village Dibbi. The prosecution witnesses 
have merely deposed that they had seen a dead body being placed on the 
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ekka and taken to village Dibbi. None of the prosecution witness has 
however, deposed that he had seen the face of the dead body or 
identified the same. In the absence of such evidence it would not be 
reasonable to assume that the dead body which was taken out from the 
dispensary and placed on the ekka was that of the deceased. In the 
absence of identification of dead body by the witnesses it is not legiti-
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mate to hold that the dead body which was taken out from the dis-
pensary of Appellant-I was that of deceased. [62E-F, GI 
4.I There is another vital defect in the prosecution case. The 
prosecution failed to produce any evidence that the deceased was taken 
to the dispensary for treatment by Appellant-2 and other accused 
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persons while she was alive and that she was admitted to the dispensary 
of Appellant-I for treatment, at a time when she was alive. In the 
absence of any such evidence there are various possibilities and 
probabilities, one of them being that the deceased may have been 
brought to the dispensary f

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