HARDEV SINGH versus HARPREET KAUR & ORS.

Citation: [2019] 14 S.C.R. 120 · Decided: 07-11-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
HARDEV SINGH
v.
HARPREET KAUR & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1331 of 2013)
NOVEMBER 07, 2019
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – s.9 – Interpretation
of – High Court directed registration of FIR for criminal offence u/
s. 9 of the Act, 2006 against the appellant – It was alleged that
appellant was only 17 years, when he married respondent no.1 –
However, it is not disputed that respondent no.1 (wife of the
appellant) was a major at the time of marriage – Held: A literal
interpretation of ss.2(a), 2(b) and 9 would mean that if a male aged
between the years of eighteen and twenty-one contracts marriage
with a female above eighteen years of age, female adult would not
be punished, but it is the male who would be punished for
contracting a child marriage, though he himself is a child – However,
such interpretation goes against the object of the Act – The intention
was to punish the male adults contracting child marriages to protect
minor young girls – This is also supported by the marginal note of
the s.9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child”
– Thus, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts
a child marriage” in s.9 should be read as “male adult above
eighteen years of age marries a child” – In the instant case, the
High Court committed error on the face of record as appellant was
17 years old i.e. below  eighteen years when he married respondent
no.1 – Hence, s.9 was not applicable to the appellant – Accordingly,
the direction of the High Court to register FIR quashed and the
impugned order set aside – Interpretation of statutes.
Interpretation of statutes – Marginal note of section – Held:
It is well settled that where any ambiguity exists with regard to the
interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be
used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the
legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy.
   [2019] 14 S.C.R. 120
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Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. Section 2(a) of the Prohibition of Child Marriage
Act, 2006 defines child as a person who, if a male, has not
completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not
completed eighteen years of age. Under Section 2(b) of the Act,
“child marriage” means a marriage to which either of the
contracting parties is a child. Thus, even if the husband is between
eighteen and twenty-one years of age, it can be treated as a child
marriage. [Para 3.1] [124-C]
2.  It is not in dispute that Respondent No.1 (wife of the
Appellant) was a major at the time of marriage. The 2006 Act
does not make any provision for punishing a female adult who
marries a male child. Hence, a literal interpretation of the above
provisions of the 2006 Act would mean that if a male aged
between the years of eighteen and twenty-one contracts marriage
with a female above eighteen years of age, the female adult would
not be punished, but it is the male who would be punished for
contracting a child marriage, though he himself is a child.
[Para 3.2] [124-D-E]
3. Section 9 of the 2006 Act must be viewed in the backdrop
of the gender dimension to the practice of child marriage. Thus,
it can be inferred that the intention behind punishing only male
adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls
from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent
effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above
eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out
of such marriages. However, it cannot be gleaned that the
legislators sought to punish a male between the age of eighteen
and twenty-one years who contracts into a marriage with a female
adult. Instead, the 2006 Act affords such a male, who is a child for
the purposes of the Act, the remedy of getting the marriage
annulled by proceeding under Section 3 of the 2006 Act. Hence,
male adults between the age of eighteen and twenty-one years of
age, who marry female adults cannot be brought under the ambit
of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks
to remedy. [Para 3.8] [126-E-G]
HARDEV SINGH v. HARPREET KAUR & ORS.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
4.  This view is supported by the marginal note of Section
9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child”. It
is well settled that where any ambiguity exists with regard to the
interpretation of a leg

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