HARBHAJAN SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1965] 3 S.C.R. 235 · Decided: 02-03-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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HARBHAJAN SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
March 2, 1965 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND V. RAMA-
SWAMI, JJ.] 
Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860) s. 499, Exception Nine-
Scope of. 
The Government of Punjab issued a press note stating that cer-
tain dailies in the States were publishing false reports alleging the 
complicity of a Nlinister's son in smuggling, that the allegations vvere 
made with a view to malign the Government, and, that the name 
of the son should be openly mentioned. In response to that challenge 
the appellant, who was a public worker, publ'shed a statement in 
the prei;s, naming the Chief Minister's son as the leader of the emui;-
glers, and as also responsible for a large number of crimes. ~c also 
requested that the Government should appoint a committee of 
independent Judges to inquire into the matter. The Ch'ef Minder's 
son then filed a complaint of. defamation against the appellant. After 
the complainant and his witnesses were examined, the appellcnt filed 
a detailed written statement in answer to the questions under s. 342, 
Criminal Procedure Code, ten months after he was questioned underl 
that section. He claimed therein the protection of both the First 
and Ninth Exceptions to s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. At the 
very commencement of the proceedings, he gave a list of 328 witnesses 
to be examined on his behalf. He was allowed to summon only 35 
and eventually he examined 2() defence witnesses. He also produced 
several documents. After considering the oral and documentary 
evidence, the trial Court convicted the appellant. In his appeal to 
the High Court, he claimed only the protection of tee Ninth 
Exception th'.t is, that he published the statement in good fcith and 
for public good. The High Court dismissed the appeal, with a modi-
fication in the sentence. 
In his appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that, in 
appreciating his evidence in respect. of good faith, the High Court 
had misdirected itself. 
HELD: A broad survey of the evidence led by the appellant. and 
the background in which the impugned statement was made, show 
that the H'gh Court was in error in holding that the nppellant had 
failed to show that he acted in good faith when he published thr, 
statement. (253 B-C] 
(ii) The High Court had misdirected itself in dealing with the 
question about the nature and scope of the onus of proof which the 
appellant had to discharge in seeking the protection of the Ninth 
Exception, because, it held that in discharging the onus, the plea 
should be proved by the appellant as strictly as if the complainant 
was being prosecuted for the offence. Where the burden of an issuf' 
lies upon the accused under s. 105 of the Evidence Act. he i' !tot 
required to discharge the burden by lead'ng evidence to prove his 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if he succeeds .in 
proving a preponderance of probability, for then, the burden is shifted 
to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus that 
never sh'fts, that is, to establish on the whole case the guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. (240 H; 241 C-G; 243A-B] 
R. v. Carr-Braint, [1943 J 2 All. E.R. 156, referred to. 
(ii) While dealing with the appellant's claim for protection under 
the Ninth Exception, the High Court had confused the requirements 
236 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1965] 3 S.C.Jlt 
of the First Exception with those of the Ninth. It was not necessary 
to consider whether the appellant had strictly proved the truth of 
the allegation made by him, because, proof of truth of the impugned 
statement is not an element of the Ninth Exception as .it is of the 
First. What the Ninth Exception requires an accused person to prove 
is that he made the statement in gcod faith. The question as to 
whether the accused acted in good faith would depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. What is the nature of the imputa-
tion made; under what circumstances did it come to be made; what 
is the status of the person who makes the imputation; was there any 
malice in his mind when he made the imputation; did he make any 
enquiry before he made it; are there reasons to aocept his story, that 
he acted 'Nith due care and attention and was satisfied that the 
imputation was true; these, and other considerations would be 
relevant in deciding the question. [243 B-E; 244 G'H] 
(iii) The High Court also erred in holding that the appellant's 
written s!ate

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