HARBHAJAN SINGH versus PRESS COUNCIL OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation: [2002] 2 S.C.R. 369 · Decided: 11-03-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.C. LAHOTI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

HARBHAJAN SINGH 
A 
v. 
' 
PRESS COUNCIL OF INDIA AND ORS. 
MARCH I I, 2002 
[R.C. LAHOTI AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.) 
B 
Press Council Act, J 978-Section 6(7)-Member of Press Council-
Eligibility for nomination-Member holding office for two terms in the past-
.. 
Whether the provision debars such person from being nominated again-- c 
y 
Held, no-8ince the provision debars a 'retiring' member from 'renomination 
a11d not a 'retired' member from 'nomination'. 
Interpretation of statutes-While interpreting a provision ordinary, 
grammatical and fall meaning is to be assigned to the words used. 
D 
The question for consideration in the present appeal is whether Section 
6(7) of Press Council Act, 1978 debars a person who had been a member of 
the Council for two terms in the past from being nominated. 
-
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
E 
HELD: I.I. Section 6(7) of the Press Council Act, 1978 must be assigned 
its ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning as the language is plain and 
simple. There is no evidence available, either intrinsic or external, to read 
the word 'retiring' as 'retired'. Nor can the word 're-nomination' be read as 
nomination for an independent term detached from the previous term of F 
membership or otherwise than in succession. The provision on its plain reading 
does not disqualify or make ineligible a person from holding the office of a 
member of the Council for more than two terms in his life. The use of the 
words 'retiring' as qualifying 'member' coupled with the use of word 're-
nomination' clearly suggests that a member is disqualified for being a member 
for the third terms in continuation in view of his having held the office of G 
"" 
membership for more than two terms just preceding, one of which terms, the 
later one, was held on re-nomination. Such an interpretation does not lead to 
any hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly and, therefore, 
the rule of ordinary and natural meaning being followed cannot be departed 
from. [378-F; 379-B) 
H 
369 
370 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2002] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
1.2. A retiring member is ineligible for re-nomination. 'Not more than 
one term' qualifies 're-nomination'. The words 'retiring', used in present 
tense, and 're-nomination', speak aloud of the intention of the Legislature. If 
>--
the word 'retiring' was capable of being read as 'retired' (sometime in past) 
then there would have been no occasion to use 're-nomination' in the 
B 
construction of the sentence. If the intention of law framers would have been 
not to permit a person to be a member of council for more than two terms in 
his lifetime then a different, better and stronger framing of the provision was 
expected. It could have been said-'no member shall be eligible for nomination 
for more than two terms', or it could have been said-'a retired member shall 
not be eligible for nomination for more than two terms'. (373-D-G] 
c 
Nagendra Nath Dey and Anr. v. Suresh Chandra Dey and Ors., AIR (1932) 
~ .... 
P.C. 165; General Accident Fire Life Assurance Corporation Ltd v. Janmahomed 
Abdul Rahim, AIR (1941) P.C. 6; Siraj-il-Haq Khan and Ors. v. The Sunni 
Central Board ofWaqfU.P. and Ors., [1959) SCR 1287; F.S. Gandhi (Dead) by 
" 
Lrs. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (1990) 3 SCC 624 and D.R Venkatq.chalam 
~
D v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc., (1977] 2 SCC 273, referred to. 
Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal., (1976) 3 All ER 611; 
Maradana Mosque (Board of Trustees) v. Badi-ud-Din Mahmud and Anr., (1966) 
1 All ER 545 and Salomon v. Saloman and Co., (1897) AC 22 38, referred to. 
_,._ 
E 
Statutory Interpretation by Cross (Third Edition 1995); .Principle of Statutory 
Interpretation by justice G.P. Singh, (Eighth Edition, 2001), referred to. 
2. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words 
used while interpreting a provision to honour the golden rule of interpretation 
Legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and, 
,.,..., 
F therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words 
employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless 
material-intrinsic or external-is available to permit a departure from the rule. 
[373-C-D] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2035 of 
G 2002. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3 .200 l of the Delhi High Court 
..., 
in· L.P.A. No. 416 of 2000. 
K. Ramamurthy, S.K. Bandyopadhyay, Ms. Hema Sahu and C.L

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