HAMIDA versus RASHID @ RASHEED AND ORS.

Citation: [2007] 5 S.C.R. 937 · Decided: 27-04-2007 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.P. MATHUR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

,.. 1 
HAMID A 
A 
v. 
RASHID @ RASHEED AND ORS. 
APRIL 27, 2007 
[G.P. MATHURANDA.K. MATHUR,JJ.] 
B 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
s.482-Power under-Held, has to be exercised sparingly with c 
circumspection and in rare cases and to correct patent illegalities or when 
some miscarriage of justice is done-while exercising power under s.482, 
High Court cannot grant bail as there is specific provision in the Code under 
which accused could approach the appropriate Court for grant of bail-
Bail-Suggestions to High Court to spend its valuable time in hearing 
murder appeals rather than entertaining s.482 petitions at interlocutory D 
stage which are often filed with oblique motive to circumvent the prescribed 
procedure. 
Prosecution case was that accused-respondents attacked the deceased, 
husband of complainant-appellant due to which deceased received serious 
injuries. Complainant lodged an FIR and case was registered under ss.324, E 
352 and 506 IPC. The deceased was hospitalized. The accused moved bail 
application. The CJM observed that remand of the accused had been sought 
only in the offences in which the case had been registered against them and 
as the offences were bailable, they were entitled to bail. 
Accordingly CJM granted bail. After 3 days, victim died. Thereafter, F 
the offence was converted into one under s.304 IPC. The accused-respondents 
filed a petition under s.482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court seeking a direction 
to the CJM, to permit them to remain on same bail even after conversion of 
the offence into one under s.304 IPC. The only submission made before the 
High Court was that on the same facts and circumstances, the accused had G 
been granted bail by the CJM and they had not misused the privilege of the 
bail and, therefore, they should be allowed to remain on bail even after 
conversion of offence. The High Court accepted the prayer made on behalf of 
the accused respondent and granted bail. Hence the present appeal. 
937 
H 
938 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2007] 5 S.C.R. 
A 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
B 
HELD: I.I. The inherent power conferred on the High Courts under 
s.482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare 
cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of 
justice is done. (Para 7] (943-A] 
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1978) SC 47; Stte v. Navjot 
Sandhu, [2003) 6 SCC 641 and Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 
6 sec 146, relied on. 
1.2. A petition under s.482 Cr.P.C. cannot be entertained if there is any 
C other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the 
grievance of the aggrieved party. [Para 9) (944-C) 
2. The power under s.482 Cr.P.C. could not have been exercised by the 
High Court in granting bail to the accused respondents is there as a specific 
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure viz. Section 439 under which 
D the accused could approach the appropriate Court for grant of bail to them. 
While exercising power under s.482 Cr.P.C., the High Court has committed 
grave error in issuing the direction that the bail granted to the accused for 
an offence under ss.324, 352, and 506 IPC will enure to their benefit even 
after conversion of the case which was registered against them into one under 
E s.304 IPC. The accused respondents ought to have surrendered and after they 
had been taken into custody, they should have applied afresh for bail in the 
offence under s.304 IPC. (Para 5( (942-A, B, C, DJ 
3. S.482 Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court and its 
language is quite explicit when it says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed 
p to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders 
as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent 
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 
A procedural Code, however, exhaustive, cannot expressly provide for all time 
to come against all the cases or points that may possibly arise, and in order 
that justice may not suffer, it is necessary that every court must in proper 
G cases exercise its inherent power for the ends of justice or for the purpose of 
carrying out the other provisions of the Code. It is well established principle 
that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do that real 
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists or to 
prevent abuse of 

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