HAMDARD DWAKHANA (WAKF), DELHI & ANR. versus UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1965] 2 S.C.R. 192 · Decided: 23-11-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

HAMDARD DWAKHANA (WAKF'), DELID & ANR. 
A 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 
November 23, 1964 
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., M. H!DAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH, 
B 
S. M. SIKRI AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.] 
Fruit Products Order 1955-Issued under s. 3 Essential Commoditie• 
Act, 1955-C/ause JI of the order specifying qualitative requirements for 
beverages containing fruit juices-Whether order 'dealt with adulteration 
of fruit products-Therefore whether invalid not having been issued under 
the Food Adulteration Act, 1954-A/so whether restriction Order made 
thereunder invalid for infringing Trade mark rights. 
The appellants manufacture a medicated syrup "Sharbat Roob Afza" 
according to a formula and containing some fruit juices. 
Acting under 
s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Go<crnment 
made the Fruit Products order in 1955; as a result of an· a1nendn1ent in 
September 1956 of the relevant provisions of this Order, the requirement 
of the minimum percentage of fruit juices in a fruit syrup covered in 
part II of the Second Schedule of the Fruit Order was raised from 10% 
to 25 % . This requirement was duly notified to the Appellants. 
There-
after as a result of an inspection of their factory by the Marketing deve-
lopment Officer, the appellants received an order from him requiring them 
to stop further manufacture and sale of 'Sharbat Rooh Afza' forthwith on 
the ground that it did not contain the minimum percentage of fruit juices 
prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Fruit Order. The appellants 
challenged this order in a Writ Petition on the ground, inter alia, that the 
Fruit Order did not apply to 'Sharbat Roob Afza' and also that the impugned 
order and the Fruit Order were invalid. The High Court, however, re-
jected these grounds, uphdd the Yalidity of the Fruit Order and dio-
missed the petition. 
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the 'Sbarbat' was a 
medicinal product and not a 'fruit product' as defined by cl. 2(d) of 
the Fruit Order; that the Fruit Order was invalid because it could have 
appropriately been issued only under the Prevention of Food Adulterntion 
Act, 1954,,.,and not the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; and that the 
impugned order was invalid because it affected the appellant's Trade-mark 
rigts. 
HELD : (i) The Sharbat was a fruit product v.ithin the meaning of cl. 
2(d)(v) of the Fruit order as the residuary part of that clause tock in 
any bcverazes. containing fruit juices or fruit pulp; as such, its product!on 
could be contrvlled by the relevant provisions of the order. 
The. High 
Court was right in rejecting the appellant's contention that the Sharbat was 
a medicinal nroduct in vie\v of the fact that the appellants had not claimed 
exemption f;om the application of the Fruit Order by complying with Cl. 
16(l)(c) thereof. [200 E-G; 201 H; 203 A] 
(ii) As section 3 (i) of the Essential. Commodities A.ct authorised the 
Central Government to regulate the quahtahve and quant1tat1ve production 
of essential commodities, and as the pith and substance of lhe relevant 
provisions of the Fruit Order was clearly to regulate the qualitative produc-
tion of the Fruit Products covered by it, the contention that the regu-
lations imposed by the order were outside the purview of s. 3(i), could 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
HAMDARD DWAKHANA v. UNION (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 193 
not be accepted. The order was not therefore invalid on the ground that 
it pmported to tackle the problem of adultetation and should therefore 
have b-een issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 
[201 D---202 CJ 
(iii) ·n1e Fruit Order and the Act under v..-hich it \\,.as issued were 
constitutionally valid as the restrictions imposed by them \Vere reasonable 
and in the interest of the general public. 
What the impugned order pur-
ported to do was to require the appellants to comply wilh reasonable restric-
tions imposed by the Fruit Order and the fact that, incidentally, compli-
ance with the Fruit Order might tend to affect the trade-mark rights, 
could not render the impu';lled order invalid. [203 D-EJ 
(iv) The definition of 'synthetic beverage' in cl. 2(k) of the Fruit 
OrdeT which indicates that it is a beverage which contains no fruit juice 
cannot be said to conflict with the requirements of c:!. 11 (2) that beverages 
containing Jess than 25% fruit juices should be ~:>-Id as 'synthetic' pro-
ducts. 
Furthermore, cl. 11 contains a positive p

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