HABIBA KHATOON versus UBAIDUL HUQ AND ORS.

Citation: [1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 251 · Decided: 05-08-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. MAJMUDAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

HABIBA KHATOON 
A 
v. 
UBAIDUL HUQ AND pRS. 
AUGUST 5, 1997 
[S.B. MAJMUDAR AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.) 
B 
Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
Section 15(b}-Agreement of Reconveyance-Construction of-Assign-
ment of right under the Agreement to a third person-Assignee filing Suit for C 
Specific performance of Agreement of reconveyance-Suit challenged on the · 
ground that right to repurchase was personal right to persons specified in the 
Agreement and was not assignable-Held, normally any interest in a contract 
coult:i be assigned to any representative-in-interest who can enforce specific 
performance of the contract unless the contract . expressly or by ·necessary 
implication, prohibits assignment to third parties-On facts, held, Agreement D 
does not prohibit assignment. 
A, original vendor, sold a house to S, original vendee, and along with 
the Sale Deed, S. executed an Agreement of reconveyance in favour of A 
to reconvey the suit property Within 3 years on return of the sa~e con-
E 
sideration. S sold his right, title and interest in the said property in favour 
of the appellant. After the death of original vendor, her son became entitled 
tO enforce the said right. The son of original vendor assigned under a Sale 
Deed his right to repurchase the house in favour of Z, plaintiff and 
predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos. 1 to 3. Z filed a suit for Specific 
performance of Agreement of reconveyance in respect of the said house F 
against the original v~ndee and the appellant, which was contested by them 
on the ground that the right to repurchase was a personal right granted 
to the persons ·specified in the document of reconveyance and was_ not 
assignable by the said persons. 
Trial Court held that the right of reconveyance was not personal and G 
could be validly assigned by the persons mentioned therein and decreed 
the suit. Appeal filed by the appellant against the order of the trial court 
was dismissed by the first appellate Court. Against the order of the first 
appellate Court, appellant preferred Second Appeal in the High Court· 
which was also dismissed. Hence this appeal. 
H 
251 
252 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A 
The appellant contended that the Courts below had patently erred 
in construing the relevant recitals in the Agreement of Reconveyance as 
the Agreement conferred a personal right to enforce reconveyance of the 
suit property only to the persons specified in the Agreement and impliedly 
prohibited such persons from assigning their right to repurchase to out· 
B siders, by placing great emphasis on the word 'only' used in the document; 
and that the right to enforce reconveyance was linked up with an obligation 
to pay the cost of improvements made by the original vendee and the 
appellant in the suit property and this part of the obligatio'n, which was 
part and parcel of the entire package of contractual right and obligation 
C of the beneficiary under the Agreement of Reconveyance, did not get 
conveyed to the plaintiff and therefore, the suit was liable to fail. 
The respondent contended that the right to get the property recon-
veyed under the Agreement of Reconveyance was not the personal right of 
anyone and it was not hedged in either expressly or by necessary implica· 
D tion by the recitals in the agreement of reconveyance and was assignable; 
that the obligation to pay the cost of improvements had nothing to do with 
the right of repurchase flowing from the express terms of the Agreement 
between the parties; and alternatively, that there was no evidence regarding 
maintenance of regular accounts regarding repairs by the vendee, and the 
E procedure laid down under the Agreement was not found to be followed by 
the vendee and there were concurrent findings of fact that appellant was 
not able to prove any cost of construction said to have been incurred by 
her in improving the suit house. 
F 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD : 1. The word 'only' used in the document signified a situation 
wherein on the death of the original vendor within 3 years of the Agreement 
one of her heirs and the children of that heir as contra-distinguished with 
other heirs of the original vendor were given a priority right to enforce 
G their claim to repurchase the suit house from the original vendee or his 
assignee like the appellant and with a view to exclude the other heirs of 
the original vendor from the scheme of priorities that the word 'only' was 
used in the document. Th

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