H.P. PYAREJAN versus DASAPPA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.
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A H.P. PYAREJAN v. DASAPPA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS. FEBRUARY 6, 2006 B [ARIJIT PASA VAT AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.] Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section /6(c)-Plaintijfis entitled to the benefit of specific performance of contract, if he avers and proves that he had C performed or had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section JOO-Second appeal-Finding of fact-Interference with--Not warranted, if it involves re-appreciation of evidence-Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere, is confined to hearing on D substantial question of law. Plaintiff-Respondent had filed a suit for specific performance of contract. Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suit and the first appeal, on the ground that there was no evidence by plaintiff to show that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. High E Court allowed the second appeal. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: I. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 is that any person seeking F benefit of the specific performance of contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout, entitling him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking relief. Section 16(c) mandates the plaintiff to aver in the plaint and establish as the fact by evidence aliunde that he has always been ready and willing to perform G his part of the contra~t. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief he should not be denied the relief. (127-G, H;128-AI Prem Raj v. The D.l.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd. and Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1355; Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, (1999( H IW t ; H.P. PYAREJAN v. DASAPPA(DEAD) BY LRS. [PASAYAT, J.] 121 6 sec 337; Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., 1200016 sec 420; A Anig/ase Yohannan v. Ramlatha and Ors., 120051 7 SCC 534 and Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, AIR (1928) PC 208, referred to. Cork v. Ambergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851) 117 ER 1229, referred to. 2. High Court had n<it formulated question regarding the correctness or otherwise of the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court nor discussed as to in what way the requirement of Section 16(c) regarding the proof of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part B of the contract was fulfilled. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court C suffers from serious infirmities. It suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in it under the law. Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence. 1128-B-DI Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, 11997] 4 SCC 713 and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (199715 SCC 438, relied on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1501 of2000. (From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.1997 of the Karnataka High Court in R.S.A. No. 244 of 1937. D E S.K Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar and Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the F Appellant Shantha Kumar Mahale, Rajesh Mahale, S. Manjunath and P. Narasimhan for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASA Y AT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowing the second appeal filed by the plaintiff. Factual background in a nutshell is as follows: G H \ 122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006 J 2 S.C.R. \ A The case of the plaintiff was that he entered into an agreement of sale on 22.8.1977. Though defendants I to 5 were to execute the agreement, at ~ •# the time of agreement, the fifth defendant went out saying that he would come and sign later, but did not sign it at all and only defendants I to 4 signed the agreement of sale. However, the plaintiff claimed that defendant- B 5 must also join in execution of the sale deed and prayed for a decree for specific performance. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, it was contended that all the defendants are tenants in common and co-owne
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