LexH. A. K. RAO, CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT versus COUNCIL OF INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA, NEW DELHI
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H. A. K. RAO, CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT
v.
COUNCii. OF INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA, NEW DELHI
December 13. 1966
[K. SUBBA Rt.,, C.J., J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWA!\11
AND C. A. YAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
Chartered Accou11ta11ts Act 1949-ClatH_e
(ii~, P«rf J.', SC'co_r;d Sclte-
dule-Cnuncil's polver 10 specify a"y act or omilorlon other thaJJ those
coi•ered by Act or ReRulations as 'professional mlsconduct'-scope of.
The •Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, by a notifica-
tion issued on February 22, 1964. in exCrcisc of powers confrrred by
cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Char1ercd Accountants
Act, 1949, notified, intn- alia,
that a member of the Institute shall
be deemed to be guilty of miscvnduct ir. in
con1l\!~tio1t v.·i;h elections
to the Councils of the Institute, he took pan directly or indirectly in
( 1) issuing manifestoc:s or circulars~ (2) canvassing votes by visiting
places of business or residence of the voters or in any othci· manner.
The appellant, who was a prospective candidate for election to the
Central Council of the Institute, filed a writ petition 10 quash the notifi-
cation. It wa• contended on his t>.half that the power of the Council
to issue a notification i• limited by the express provisions of cl. (ii) of
Parf II of the Second Schedule to rhe Act. Under cl. (i) any contraven-
tion of the provisions of the Act or of the Regulations made thereWlder
was erofessional misconduct; therefore the expression "other act or omis-
sion" in cl. ('i) must be an act or omission other than tbooe covered by
the Act or the Rcgulatiott<.
Under cl. ( 2) of Regulation 54-A. undue
influence by interfering with the free exercise of any electoral rights
wa• misconduct, but the provi•o to cl. (2) which permitted a declara-
tion of policy or • promise of a particular action saved the muing of
manifestoes and circulars from the operation of the substantive pan of the
clau•e.
The appellant therefore claimed that he had a legal right to
issue circulars or manifcstoe; "'·ithin the meaning of the proviso and
that the impugned no1ification hc;ng in tlcrogation ..:l :r.c
R:--&ill~tion.
was illegal.
It was further contended lh<1t the notification was inconsi!tent with
cl. (48) of Regulation 54A. bec;iuse rhat clause only prohi1'ited canvass-
ing for voles within a distance of 200 meters from the polling hoolhs,
thereby impiedly permitting canvassing beyond that dh;iance; cl. (48)
detracted only ;o a limited extenr from the leJ?I right to canvass and
the impugned notification contain!ng a prohibition against general can-
vassing beyond these limits contravened hoth cl. (2) and cl. (48) of
Regulation 54-A and was therefore bad
The High Court held that the impugned notification in so far as it
d.- .~led that the issuing of manife:;toes or circulars was misconduct. was
ii: · '1; but that the rest of it was va'.;d. On appeal to rhi. Court by the
"l'. ,:1lant and upon a cross-appeal hy the r~pondcnt.
HELD : The entire notification was valid.
Although the act of issuing a manifesto or a circular would not amount
lo undue influeocc by virtue of the proviso to Regulation 54-A(2) such
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H. A. K. RAO v. COUNCIL, I.C.A.I. (S11bba Raa, C.J.)
257
ac:t was constituted by the notification a different head of professional mis-
conduct which the Council was authorised to do under cl. (ii) of Part II
of the Second Schedule to the Act. (263 HJ
The Council had the power to issue the notification prohibiting can-
vassing of votes and the notification was not inconsistent with either the
provisions of the Act or the Regulations. [263 FJ
While the Regulations provide for discinlinary action for undue in-
ftuence and for canvassing for votes within a distance oi 200 meters
.from a _eolling booth, the notification placed
other acts and omissions
under r'ifferent heads of misconduct. There is no inherent conflict bet-
ween undue influence, canvassing of votes by visiting the places of busi-
ness or the residence of the voters, and canvassing within a distance of
200 metres from a
polling
booth.
All the three can stan<i
together.
(262 HI
The appellant did not have any unlimited right to canvass for votes
either statutoty ·or otherwise. His rights were defined by tbe statute and
it could not be said that such an unlimited right to canva5" is implicit
in the right to stand for election. [263 BJ
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