GYANENDRA SINGH @ RAJA SINGH versus STATE OF U.P.
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335 Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No(s). 1257 of 2025) 07 March 2025 [Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the conviction of the appellant ought to have been recorded under the IPC or whether the provisions of the Special law, i.e., Section 42A of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, would prevail thereby, vitiating the sentence awarded to the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2) (f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC. Headnotesβ Sentence/Sentencing β Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 β ss.42, 42A β Interpretation β Penal Code, 1860 β ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) β Appellant convicted for offences u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act, life imprisonment awarded β Appeal rejected by High Court with certain modification β Plea of the appellant that as the offences were overlapping, POCSO Act being special law would prevail over IPC and hence, the appellant could not have been convicted for both the offences: Held: Conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act is wholly justified β Under s.42, POCSO Act, when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied β s.42 and s.42A, POCSO Act operate in completely different spheres β s.42A, POCSO Act cannot be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., s.42, POCSO Act β Since, ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC provide for a higher sentence as compared to ss.3/4, POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing *βAuthor [2025] 3 S.C.R. 491 Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P. the former to award punishment in terms of s.42, POCSO ActΒ β However, the High Court erred in directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC β Under these provisions it is not mandated that the convict must be awarded life imprisonment β The sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the offence u/ss.3/4, POCSO Act revived β For offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC, the accused to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and fine, as directed. [Paras 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31] Case Law Cited Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka [2023] 4 SCR 669 : (2023) 9 SCC 817; Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala [2024] 3 SCR 913 : 2024 SCC Online SC 315; Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 4 SCR 225; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767 β referred to. List of Acts Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. List of Keywords Sections 42, 42A of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of Penal Code, 1860; Offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act; Punishment of greater degree; Sentence of life imprisonment; Imprisonment for remainder of personβs natural life; Rigour of the sentence awarded increased; Sentence of life imprisonment; Life term; Till the natural life; Special law; General law. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1257 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in JA No. 6590 of 2016 492 [2025] 3 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant: R Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Santosh Kumar Pandey, B Venkatraman, Debasish Mishra. Adv. for the Respondent: Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Shashank Pachauri. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Mehta, J. 1. Heard. 2. Delay condoned. 3. Leave granted. 4. This appeal, preferred on behalf of the appellant-accused1, takes an exception to the judgment dated 2nd August, 2019, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad2 dismissing Jail Appeal No. 6590 of 2016 preferred by the appellant. 5. The Division Bench, while dismissing the appeal, affirmed the judgment and order dated 16th September, 2016, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge C
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