GYAN CHAND versus K. B. LAL AND OTHERS

Citation: [1977] 2 S.C.R. 324 · Decided: 06-12-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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GYAN CHAND 
v. 
K. B. LAL AND OTHERS 
December 6, 1976 
(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND S. MURTAZA FAzAL 
Au. JJ.] 
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950-S. 13A-
Scope of. 
Application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution--lf could 
be equated with ordinary right of appeal . 
Order 16 of Supreme Court Rules and Order 41 Civil Procedure Cude-Dis-
tinction. 
Section 13A was introduced in Rajasthan Premises (Contr0l of Rent 
and 
Eviction) Act, 1950 by an Ordinance on September 29, 1975, The Ordinance 
was later replaced by an Act. Clause (a) of the section provides that no Court 
shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of the commencement of the Amend-
ing Ordinance, pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant 
on the ground of non-payment of rent under certain circumstances. Clause (b) 
provides that in every 3uch proceeding the Court shall, on the appiication of the 
tenant, made within 30 days from the date of the presentation of the memoran-
dum of appeal or application for revision, determine the amount of rent in 
arrears. Clause (c) provides that the provisions of els. (a) It (b) shall, 11111tatis 
mutandis, apply to all appeals, or applications for revision, preferred or made 
aft.er the commencement of the Amending Ordinance. Explanation (b) to the 
section defines a proceeding to mean a suit, appeal or application for revision. 
Section 22 ( 1) provides that from every decree or order passed by the Court 
under the Act, an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie 
from original decrees aud orders passed by such former Court. 
On the grouD,'.l of non-payment of rent, a decree of eviction was pas:;ed against 
the appellant, who was the respondent's tenant. The High Court having affirmed 
the decree on appeal, the appellant filed an application for special leave to this 
Court on September 23, 1975. The Ordinance introducing s. BA was passed 
on September 29, 1975. 
This Court granted special leave on November 14, 
1975. 
In appeal to this Court it was contended by the appellant ( 1) that since the 
application for special leave was pending before this Court on the date of the 
commencement of the Ordinance, the case was governed by s. 13A (a) and (b) 
of the Act; (2) in the alternative since, as a result of the grant of special leave, 
an appeal had been pending before this Court, the appellant was entitled to the 
protection of s. 13A(c) of the Act. 
Dismissing the appeal, 
HELD: (Per Chandrachud and Goswami, JJ) 
(1) (a) In order to attract s. 13A(a) a suit, appeal or applic<•ii'?n for 
revision mnst be pending on the date of the commencement of t.he .Ordmance. 
An application for special leave under Art. 136 of the. Constltut1011 cannot 
be equated with the ordinary remedy ~f appeal ar, of nght under any i:ro-
vision of law. 
It is an extraordinary nght conferred nude~ t~e Constttuh~n, 
within the discretion of the Supreme Court and an appltcahon for special 
leave does not come within the contemplation of appeal pending before the 
Court under s. 13A(a). 
The collocation of the words "suit, a.ppea\ or 
application for revision" used in the explanation to de!lote "proceedin!l", s~ows 
that the snits and regular apneals therefrom as provided under the ordinary 
law and applications for revision alone are intended. [329C & BJ 
 , 
, 
GYAN CHAND v. K. B. LAL (Goswami, J.) 
325 
(b) The expression "presentation of memorandum of appeal" under s. 13A 
(c) chimes with the construction !hat the legislature clearly mtended to include 
.only the hierarchy of appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure. 
[331JD] 
(c) Under s. 13A(c) .read with s. 13A(b) in a pending appeal, the tenant 
has to make an application within 30 days "from the date of presentation of the 
memorandum of appeal". 
There is no provision in an appeal by special lea1'e 
for 
presentation of memorandum of appeal, under r. 11 of O.XVI, of the 
.Supreme Court Rules, on the grant of special leave, the petition for special leave 
is treated as the petition of appeal. In contrast under 0.41 r. I (I) of the Code 
.of CiYil Procedure, every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memoran-
dum signed by the appellant a_nd presented to the Court. [329HJ 
· 
(d) The terminus al quo for the purpose of s. 13A(c) is from the date of 
presentation of !he memorandum of appeal. Since no petition of appeal has to 
be presented in the Supreme Cou

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