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GVINDLAL CHHAGGAN LAL PATEL versus THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, GODHRA AND OTHERS

Citation: [1976] 1 S.C.R. 451 · Decided: 27-08-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

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451 
GVINDLAL CHHAGGAN LAL PATEL 
v. 
THE AG RI CULTURAL 
PRODUCE MARKET 
COMMITTEE, 
GODHRA AND OTHERS 
August 27, 1975 
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWAT! AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] 
Mandatory and Directory Provision-Bon1bay Agricultu,~a[ Produce /V{arkets 
Act, 1939-Section 4 Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, ss. 
5 
and 6, 36-When ·shqll' means •may'-Principles of constitution of a sratu:e-
If language p{ain and unambiguous, whether aid of artificial guidelines to inter-
pretation possible. 
The appellant was prosecuted for having purchased a 
certain quantity of 
ginger without obtaining a licence as required by the Gujarat Agricultural Pro-
duce 11arkets Act, 1964. The trial court accepted the factum of purchase but 
it acquitted the appellant on the ground that the relevant notificat~on in regard to 
the inclusion of ginger was not shown to have been promulgated and published 
as required by th.e Act. 
On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal and sentenced the appellant 
::o a fine of Rs. 10/-. The High Court proceeded on the assumption that the 
notifications were properly made. 
In the erstwhile composite State of Bombay 
then; was in operation The Bombay Agricultural Produce .rvfarkets Act of 1939. 
On the bifurcation of the Sta·tc in 1960 the said 1939 Ac: was extended by an 
appropriate order to the State of Gujarat. That Act ren1ained in operation in 
Gujarat till the year 1964 in which year the present Act came into force. Section 5 
of the Act requires the Director to notify in the Official Gazette his intention to 
regulate the purchase and sale of agricultural produce. The section also require~ 
the publication in Gujarati in a newspaper having circulation in the area. The 
section further requires that the objections should be invited from the public. 
Section 6( 1) provides that after the expiry of the period for making objections 
and after considering the object:.ons and suggestions received and after holding 
necessary inquiry, the Director may, by notification in the Official Gazette, dec-
lare the area specified in the said notification to be a market area in respect of 
the agricultural produce to be specified in the notification. 
Sub-section ( 1) of 
s.6 further requires that the notification under the said section shall be published 
in GuJarati in a nev..•spaper having circulation in the said area. Sub.s. (5) of s. 6 
provides that the Di.rector may, at any tin1e by notification in the official gazette, 
exclude any area from a market area specific~ in a notification issued under sub-
s, ( 1) or include any area therein and exclude from or add to the kinds of agri-
cultural produce so specified. 
The sale or purcha-se of the agricultural produce 
concerned \Vithout a licence is made an offence by s. 36 of the Act. , 
On appeal by special leave, the appellant contended that the 
notification 
under s. 6(5) of the Act, covering additional varieties of agricultural produce, 
must not only be published in the Official gazette but must also be published in 
G 
Gujarati in a newspaper . 
H 
The respondent contended that ( 1) the procedure in regard to the· publicat:.On _ 
which is laid down in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 6 must be restricted to notifications issued 
under that sub-section and cannot be extended to those issued under sub-section 
(5) of s. 6; (2) Assuming that the words "this section" are wide enough to cover 
every snb-sect£-0n of s. 6. the word 'shall' ought to be read as 'may'. 
HELD : ( 1) Section 6( 1) means what it says. 
That is the normal rule ol. 
construction of statutes, a rule not certainly absolute and unqualified, but the 
conditions which bring into play the exceptions to that rule did not exist. It is 
not reasonable to assume in the legislature an ~gnorance of the distinction between 
~ ''se.::tion" of the statute and the "sub·section'' of th3.t section. The requirement 
452 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[197 6] 1 S.C.R. 
laid dov..'n bys. 6(1) that a notification under '·this section" shall also be published 
in Gujarati in a newspaper \Vol1ld govern a·ny and every no!ification i'ssued under 
any par_ of s. 6, that is to say, nnder any of the sub-sections of s. 6. 
[455E-Gl 
(2) Sometimes the legislature does not say what it means. 
That has given 
rise to a ~erie') of technical rules of interpretation devised or dcs:gned to unravel 
the n1ind of the law-n1akers. 
The words of the concluding portion of s. 6(1) 
are plain and unan1biguC>

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