GURUCHARAN SINGH versus KAMLA SINGH & ORS.

Citation: [1976] 1 S.C.R. 739 · Decided: 09-09-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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739 
GURUCHARAN SINGH 
v. 
KAMLA SINGH & ORS. 
September 9, 197 5. 
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, A. C. GUPTA ANDS. MURTAZA FAzAL ALI, JJ.] 
BUiar Land Reforms. Act, 19501 Sections 2K, 3, 4 and 6 and rule 7-Il of the 
Rules-Khas possession-Right to possess, if aniounts to possession in law. 
Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms. Act, 1950, transfers all interests in 
estates or tenures of a proprietor or t:'!nure-holder to the State as flrom a date 
notified under section 4. Section 6 carves out of this land mass .and leaves 
untouched, apait from raiyati holdings the bakasht lands in Khas possession 
. C 
of the 'intermediary' i.e., the prior full owner. 
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Several items of property were gifted by one Ram Badan Singh to bis_ two 
wives whose names were duly mutated in the revenue register. By further 
gift deeds and transfers the lands covered by the original gift deeds came to 
vest Ln the plaintiff and defendants, second party. 
They divided then1 as per a 
partition deed Exhibit 4/a dated October 30, 1952 whereby the suit lands fell· 
to the exc1usive share of the plaintiff along with some other' items while other 
properties were similarly allotted to defendants 2nd party. Despite this fact 
defendants, second party, sold the suit lands to the defendants first party alleg-
ing· an oral partition sometime before August 1952 and under l:'OVer of that 
case. committed trespass. Thereupon, a scramble for possession of these prcr 
perti:es and a proceeding under s. 145 Cr. P.C. ensued in which the defendants. 
first party, got their possession upheld by Magistrate"s order dated 5-4-1954. 
The plaintiff brought the present suit in April 1955 for a declaration of his 
title, for possession and mesne profits on the score that his exclusive pos9ession 
was by force taken away in July-August 1954 by defendants first party. 
The 
latte.r put forward the plea of prior oral partition and exclusive hostile· posse&-
s.ion, tracing their claim through dtfendants-'>econd party. The courts of fact 
found against the defendants and decreed the suit, but in Letters Patent Appeal, 
the respondents. i.e., the defendants 1st party s.ucceed-ed on the ground that the 
plaintiff had! lost his title on account of the operation of' sections 3 ·and 4 of the 
Bihar Land Reforms Act. 1950. 
In this appeal filed on the basis of the special leaw granted by this Court, 
it was contended for the appellant that (i \ Section· 6 of the Act applied to 
the facts of the case and so there wasi no vesting of title in the Stat~ of the 
suit lands; (ii) This case, resting- on the Act, which had been on the statute 
book for several' years, had not been set up at the, earlier ·stages of the litiga-
tion at and should not have been permitted at the Letters Patent Appeal stage 
in the High c·oun for the first time; and (iii) The deed Of partition was not 
legally divestative of rights in view of the provisions of the Estates Partition 
Act, 1897, which empowered the Collector along to partition the preperties, 
which not having been done, the lands remained in co-ownership wherefore the 
possession of the defendants first party, was that of co-sharers. 
If that were so. 
the possesslon of one co.sharer was constructive possessioill of the other CO"'\Sharer 
and the plaintiff was thus 'in khaS possoosion under s. 2k of the Act and, on that 
basis, s. 6 of the Act saved the disputed properties from· vesting in the State. 
Rejecting the contentions exC'ept to, a small extent of modifying the decree, 
HELD : (i) It is well settled that a pure question of law going to the root 
of the ca"'e and based- on undisputed· or proven facts could be raised even 
before the Court of last resort, provided the opp06iie side was not taken by 
surprise or otherwise unfairly prejudiced [745·E·FJ 
Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Kavanach. [1892) A.C. 
473. 480. 
r~ferred to. 
740 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[J 976] 1 S.C.R. 
In the present case, the new plea springs from the common case of the 
parties and nothing which may work injustice by allowance of this contention 
has been made out. 
[746--A] 
(ii) The Magistrate did not direct possession of the B-Schedule properties 
to be handed over to the defendants, first party, but declared their actual 
possession. He has done no wrong nor conferred any unjust advantage. There 
is no principle on which it could be held that these circumstances deprive a 
party of the benefit of his possession and or 

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