LexGURCHARAN SINGH BALDEV SINGH versus YASHWANT SINGH AND ORS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
---;
I
{
GURCHARAN SINGH BALDEV SINGH
v.
Y ASHW ANT SINGH AND ORS;
NOVEMBER 15.1991
[M.H. KANIA AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act,1939: Section 58(2)-Proviso.
A
B
Stage Carrier-Pennit-Application for renewal of pennit under
1939 Act-Enforcement of Motor Vehicles Act,1988 during pendencY of
application-Effect Of--Held preference created in favour of a pennit C
holder for consideration and grant of pennit is a rigliJ enforceable in
law-By virtue of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 such a
right is saved by section 217(4) of the 1988 Act-Absence of preference
clause in section 81 of the 1988 Act does not destroy the claim for re-
newal set in motion under the 1939 Act.
General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 6(c)
Statute-Repeal-Effect of-Object of section 6(c) explained.
The appellant, a Stage Carriage Operator, filed an application
D
fo,r renewal of his permit under section 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles
J\,d, 1939 and his application was notified. However, before the E
renewal could be granted the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into
force. The respondent had also applied for a fresh permit on the
same route on which the appellant was operating his carriage. The
Regional Transport Authority allowed renewal of the appellant's
permit and rejected the respondent's application. On respondent's
appeal the State Transport Appellate Tribunal held that no appeal
F
against renewal was maintainable. The respondent filed a writ peti-
tion and the High Court allowed it by holding that right to seek
renewal of a permit was not a vested right but was merely an .focohate
right which ripened into a right only on being granted; with the
coming into force of 1988 Act, the 1939 Act/was repealed as a result
of which the appellant's application for renewal ceased to exist and G
consequently the Regional Transport Authority was not empowered
to grant a renewal of permit. Against the decision of the High Court
an appeal was filed in this Court.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High .
Court, this Court,
·
~,
H
305
A
B
c
D
.E
F
G
H
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
HELD: 1. The High Court committed a manifest error of law
in rejecting the appellant's application of renewal on the ground
that the new Act had come into force. [310-H]
1.1 Although section 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
uses the word 'may' but read with proviso it creates a-preference in
favour of a permit holder to claim renewal if other conditions were
equal. A holder of a permit thus stands OD a better footing. The
preference created by sub-section (2) of Section 58 for consideration
· of the permit and its grant cannot be said to be a mere iocohate
right, or a right which does not exist in law. It may not be a vested
right or a fundamental right but it certainly is civil right which
could be enforced in a court of law and any authority acting in
contravention of it can be forced to act in accordance with it. [310
B-C)
1.2 The right accrued to appellant as he had already applied
for renewal and his application had been notified. The legal ma-
chinery was set in motion by him. He therefore had a right to get
his application for renewal processed and considered in accordance
with 1939 Act. It would be too technical to say that no right bad
acer ued to him under 1939 Act. By virtue of Section 6(c) of the
General Clauses Act the right of the appellant to get his application
considered and decided in accordance with law was saved by sub-
section (4) of Section 217 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [310 D-E]
. The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd v. Janardan Ramchandra
Kulkarni & Ors, (1960] 3 S.C.R.85, followed.
Cheran Transport Co. Ltd. v. Kanan Lorry Service & Anr, [1977) ·
2 S.C.R. 389; D.Nataraja Mudaliar v. State Transport Authority,
Madras [1979) 1S.C.R.522, referred to.
2. The objective of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act is
to ensure protection of any right or privilage acquired under the
repealed Act. The only exception to it is legislative intention to the
contrary. That is, the repealing Act may expressly provide or it may
impliedly provide against· continuance of such right, oblig.ation or
liability. [309-E]
3. The new Act is a legislation on the same subject and Sec-
tion 81 of the said Act specifically provides for renewal of permits.
The scheme of renewal having been continued even under new Act.
mere absence of preferenExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.