GURBINDER SINGH AND ANOTHER versus LAL SINGH AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1965] 3 S.C.R. 63 · Decided: 12-02-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
GURBINDER SINGH AND ANOTHER 
v. 
LAL SINGH AND AN01BER 
February 12, 1965 
(K. SOBBA R.Ao, R.AGHUBAR DAYAL, J. R. MUDHOLKAR, 
R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] 
63 
Indian. Limitation Act (9 of 1908), s. 2(4) and Arts. 142 and 144-
Scope of. 
One Mst. Raj Kaur was holding certain lands on different 
tenures under the Raja of Faridkot. She had two daughters. She 
adopted the son of one of them and put him in possession of all 
C the lands: He transferred a part of the lands to the second respon-
dent who was son of the other daughter of Raj Kaur. After Raj 
Kaur's deaJth the Raja filed suits for possession of the land, and 
in execution of the decree he obtained in those suits, took posses-
sion of the entire land, in October, 1938. He then transferred the 
land, but the transferee was dispossessed by the appellants in June 
1950, in execution of· a decree they obtained, in a suit for pre-
D 
emption filed by them against the transferee. The second respon-
dent's mother had died in 1938 and her sons the first and seco11d 
respondents filed a suit for possession of the entire land in 
February 1950, as heirs of Raj Kaur, but it was decreed only to 
the extent of their ha!£ share, and the decree was affirmed by the 
High Court. 
In the appeal to this Court it was contended that the suit was 
E 
governed either by Art. 142 or Art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 
1908, and on either basis, was barred by time. 
F 
HELD: (i) Article 142 would not be attracted to the suit. 
In order thalt the article may be attracted the plaintiff must 
initially have been in possession of the property and should have 
been dispossessed by the defendant- or some one through whom 
the defendant claims or alternatively, the plaintiff should have 
discontinued possession. It was no one's ca~e it.hat the first respon-
dent was ever in possession of the property. As regards the second 
respondent's possession at 011e time of a part of the property, it 
was by reason of a transfer by the adopted son. The claim in the 
instant case, however, was by succession, under a different title 
altogether, and so it must be held that the plaintiffs-respondents, 
as heirs of Raj K;!ur, were never in possession of the land. [65H] 
G. 
(ii) Article 144 was applicable to the suit, but the suit was 
H 
not barred by time. 
Adverse possession against the respondents started in October. 
1938, when the Raja took possession of the land. To that adverse 
possession could be added that of his transferee and that of the 
appeliants who had pre-empted the lands under the decree obtained 
by them against the transferee. Bult, the sum total of the adverse 
possession of all those persons at the date of the respondent's 
suit would be less than 12 years. The adverse possession of the 
adopted son could not be tacked on to the adverse possession of the 
Raja and those who claim through him, because, in a suit to which 
Art 144 is attracted,_ the burden is on the defendant to establish 
that he was in adverse possession for 12 years before the date of 
suit, and for computation of that period, he can avail himself of 
the adverse possession of any person or persons through whom 
he claims but not the adverse possession of independent tres-
64 
SUPREME 
COURT 
REPORTS 
(196/i) 3 B.C.R. 
passers. Th7 starting point of limitation in Art. 144 is the date when 
A 
the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff The 
~ist of t~e definition .of the word "defendant" in s. 2(4) of th~ Act 
is the ex1ste.nce of a JUra_l relationship between the different persons 
referred to m. the defimt10n, and there can be no jural relationship 
between two mdependent· trespassers. [66 F-H; 68C; 70B]. 
Ramayya v. Kotamma, (1921) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 370, explained. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 431of1963. 
B 
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 21 1958 of 
the Punjab High Court in Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 263-P 
of 1952. 
Tarachand Brijmohanlal, for the appellants. 
B. R. L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the res- a 
pondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Mudholkar, 1. The only question for consideration in this 
appeal by certificate from the High Court of Punjab is whether the 
suit for possession instituted by the respondents Lal Singh and D 
Pratap Singh is within time. According to the appellants the suit 
is governed not by art. 1_41 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908) 
as held by the High Court but eith

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