GURBAKSH SINGH versus UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

Citation: [1976] 3 S.C.R. 247 · Decided: 27-01-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

') 
GURBAKSH SINGH 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS 
January 27, l'i76 
247 
A 
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, A. C. GUPTA AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.] 
8 
Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to the Union Territory 
of Dcliu-Sections 11, llA and 20-Scope of. 
Section 11 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to the 
Union Territory of Delhi provides for assessment of tax. Section 1 lA pro-
vides for assessment or reassessment in case of escaped or under-assessment. 
Section 20 provides for appeals and revision. 
In 1959 the assessee was assessed by the Sales Tax Officer for the assessment 
year 1955-56. The appellate authority remanded the matter holding that the 
assessment for the first two quarters \Vas invalid having been made out of time. 
The Sales Tax Officer passed a fresh assessment order in respect of the third 
and fourth quarter of the assessment year. 
In July, 1960, the Commissioner 
under s. 20(3) revised the appellate order holding that no part of the assess-
ment was barred by limitatjon and 
directed fresh 
assessment. Appellant's 
challenge; to the order of the CommiS~ioner and the assessment order by the 
a'isessing Ltuthority was unsuccessful in the High Court. 
c 
D 
On appeal to this Court, it \Vas contended : (i) that the revisional authority 
n1ust exercise his powers within the pericxl of four years prescribed under s. 
11(2) (a) \Vhether the order \Vas a final order of assessment by him or a remand 
order for fresh assessment by the assessing authority: (ii) while exercising the 
rower of revision the Commissioner cannot ignore the period of limitation of 
three ycays._provi~eJ ins. llA; (iii) even when the Commissioner was exercising 
the revisional power under s. 20(3), his power is subject to the periods of limita-
E 
tion p:·ovidcd because, in ss. l l. 11 A and 20. the .authority mentionr.LI is the Co1n-
missicner and (iv) the Revisional authority in the exercise of hi<> power suo 
111oto mu:::t exercise it within a reasonable time and not after a long lapse of 
time. 
Dismissing the appeals, 
1-fbLD : The Legislature has not provided any period within which an order 
is to be rn.ade by an appellant or revisional. authority or a court. [250 E] 
F 
. (l )(a) If the appeal.is filed in time for the exercise of the appellate power 
either to assess or to direct assessment under s. 20(2), there is no limitation 
of time. The limits of the revisional power in s. 20(3) are akin to the power of 
the "ppellatc "uthority in'· 20(2). [250 F·Hl 
(b) No limitation has been provided for the suo 1noto exerci'Se of the re-
visional power similar to the one provided in rule 66(2) of the Delhi Sales Tax 
Rule<; for filing an application in revision. 
[251 D] 
G 
( c) It will be wholly unreasonable-almost impossible-to say that all orders 
in appeal, revision or reference must be passed within four 
years of the end 
of the period of assessment and that otherwise they would be 
barred 
The 
contention that there would be anomaly because of s. 11 (2a) in that fr 
the 
apMllate or revisional authority made a remand order, the assessing authority 
could pass <I fresh assessment order within four years 
of the remand 
order 
whereas if the appellate or revisional authority itself passed 
an 
order of 
assessment. H .shout? ~e done within four ye~r.s; and that such an anomaly 
\vould be avoided 1£ 1t was held that the rev1s1ng authority must exercise its 
powers within four years in all cases is not warranted by the language of the 
provision. 
Further, it does not solve the anomaly because even if the order 
H 
248 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1976] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
of remand is made just on the last day of the period of four years it would be 
competent to the assessing authority to make a- fresh asscssn1ent within the fur-
ther period of four years. 
[252 D; B-C] 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
(d) The State of Orissa v. Debki Debi [15 STC, 153 (SC] is distinguishable 
because the period of limitation in that case 
applied to assessment made 
in 
exercise of the appellate or revisional power also; whereas in the present case 
there is no period of limitation for the exercise of appellate or revisional power. 
f252 Fl 
(2) While correcting a mistake in exercise of his revisional power the Com-
niissioner \Vas merely setting right the illegality in the appellate order, nnd was 
not doing anything which the Sales Tax Officer was empowered to do under 
s. 1 J A au<l so was not bound by the period of limitation mentio

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