GURBAKSH SINGH SIBBIA ETC . versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1980] 3 S.C.R. 383 · Decided: 09-04-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Case Partly allowed
Cited by 27 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case
Judgment (excerpt)

.J 
383 
GURBAKSH: SINGH SIBBIA ETC . 
A 
• 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
April 9, 1980 
[Y. V. CllANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA, 
8 
R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CIUNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 
Bail-Anticipatory Bail-Section 438 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure 
Code, 1913 (Act 2 of 1974), Scope of-Judicial balancing of personal lib<rly 
and the investigarional powers of the Police, explained. 
The appellant here.in, Sri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia was a Minister of Irriga..J 
C 
tion and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab. Grave 
allegations of political corruption were made against him and others whereupon 
applications were filed in the High Court of Puujab and Haryaua under section 
438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, praying that the appellauts be directed to 
be relea1!ed. on bail, in the event of their arrest on the aforesaid charges. 
Conw 
sidering the importance of the matter, a learned single Judge referred the appli-
cations to a Full Bench, which by its judgment dated September, 13, 1977 dis-
D 
missed them, after summarising, what according to it is the true legal position, 
of s. 438 of the Code.of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) thus: 
(l) The power uuder Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, is of 
an extra-ordinary character and must be exercised sparingly in 
exceptional cases only. 
(2) Neither Section 438 nor any other provision of the Code autho-
rises the grant of blanket anticipatory bail for offences not yet 
committed or with regard to accusations not so far levelled. 
( 3) The said power is not unguided or uncanalised but all the 
limitations imposed in the preceding Section 437, are implicit 
E 
therein and must be read into Section 438. 
F 
( 4) In addition to the limitations mentioned in Section 437, 
the 
petitioner must make out a special case for the exercise of the 
power to grant anticipatory bail. 
(5) 
(6) 
Where a legitimate case for the remand of the offender to the 
police custody under Section 167 (2) cau be made out by the 
investigating agency or a reasonable claim to secure incriminat-
ing material from information likely to be received from the 
offender under Section 27 of the Evidence Act can be made 
out, the power under Section 438 should not be exercised. 
The discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised 
with 
regard to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for 
life unless the Court at that very stage is satisfied that such a 
charge appears to be false or groundless. 
G 
H 
B 
c 
D 
F 
G 
B 
384 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[! 980] 3 S.C.Rj 
(7) The larger interest of the public and State 
demand that in 
serious cases like economic offen~s involving blatant corrup· 
tion at the higher rungs of the executive and political power, 
the discretion under Section 438 of the Code should not be 
exercised; and 
(8) Mere general allegations of mala 
fides 
in the petition are 
inadequate. The court must be satisfied on materials 
before 
it that the allegations of mala fides are 
substantial 
and 
the 
accusation appears to be false and groundless. 
The argument that the appellants were men of substance and position who 
\Vere hardly likely to abscond and would be prepared willingly to face trial was 
rejected by the Full Bench with the observation that to accord differential treat-
ment to the appellants on account of their status will amount to negation of the 
concept of equality before the law and that it could hardly be contended that 
every man of status, who was intended to be charged with serious crimes includ-
ing the one under section 409 was punishable with life imprisonment, "was 
entitled to knock at the door of the Court for anticipatory bail". The posses-
sion of high status, according to the Full Bench, is not only an irrelevant con-
sideration for granting anticipatory bail, but is, if anything, 
an aggravating 
circumstance. Hence the appeals by special leave. 
The appellants contended : (a) The power conferred by section 438 
to 
grant anticipatory bail is "not limited to the contigencies" summarised by the 
High Court; (b) The power to grant anticipatory bail ought to be left to the 
discretion of the Court concerned, depending on the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case; ( c) Since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of 
personal liberty; Courts should lean against the imposition of unnecessary res-
trictions on the scope of Section 438, when no such restrictions are ih:iposed by 
the legislature in the t
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.