LexGULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO ETC. versus THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & OTHERS
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I959 A11gust 2r 580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO ETC. v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.) Road Transport-Scheme of nationalisation_:_Chief Minister, if can hear objections-Doctrine of bias-Motor Vehicles Act (IV of r939), as amended by Act roo of r956, Ch. IV A, s. 68D. The appellants were carrying on motor transport business in Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh. · The General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for nationalisation of motor transport and objections to the said scheme were invited. The appellants, among others, filed their objections. The Secretary in charge of the Transport Depart- ment gave personal hearing to the objectors and heard the representation made on behalf of the State Transport Under- taking. The Chief Minister, who was in charge of transport, passed the order approving the scheme. The appellants moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the said scheme and this Court in Gr<llapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, previously decided, held that the Secretary in charge 0f the Transport Department was incompetent to hear the objections on the ground that no party could be a judge in his own cause and quashed the order approv- ing the scheme. Thereafter notices were issued by the Govern- ment to the objectors. The Chief Minister himself heard the representatives of the objectors and the Road Transport Corpora- tion and passed the order approving the scheme as originally published. The appellants moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for writs of certiorari quashing the order passed by the Government confirming the scheme and subsequent orders made by the Regional Transport Authority cancelling their stage carriage permits. The High Court rejected the petitions and the appellants appealed. It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf that the same infirmity which attached to the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department on the previous occasion, attached to the Chief Minister, who was in charge of transport, and rendered him incompetent to hear the objections. Held, that the two well-settled principles of the doctrine of bias that applied equally to judicial as well as quasi-judicial tribunals, were,-(r) that no man shall be a judge in his own cause and that (2) justice should not merely be done but must also appear to be done. Any kind of bias, therefore, in a judicial authority, whether financial or other, for or against any party, or any position that might impute bias, must disqualify him as a judge. - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 581 But when a State Legislature or the Parliament, in trans- gression of the aforesaid principles, by statute empowers an authority to be a judge in its own cause or decide a dispute in which it has an official bias, such statute, unlike one passed by the English Parliament, has to stand scrutiny in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The King v. Bath Compensation Authority, [1925] I K.B. 685 and The King v. Leicester Justices, [1927] I K.B. 557, discussed. In the instant case, however, the relevant provisions of the Act do not sanction any transgression of the aforesaid principles of natural justice or authorise the Government to constitute itself a judge in its own cause. Nor could it be said that the State Government, in the present case, acted in violation of the aforesaid principles. Since the appellants never questioned the competence of the Chief Minister to decide the objections on the last occasion and obtained the judgment of this Court on that basis, it was not open to them at this stage to reopen the closed controversy or take a contrary position. The position of the Chief Minister was quite -distinct from that of the Scretary of the Department. While the Secretary of the Department was its head and so a part of it, the Minister in charge was only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that Department. It was not, therefore, correct to say that the Chief Minister was a part of the Depart- ment constituted as a Statutory Undertaking under the Act. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 198 to 200of1959. Appeals from the judgment and order dated the 5th March 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in 'Writ Petition
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