GUJARAT MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION versus SHRI P. H. BRAHMBHATT

Citation: [1974] 2 S.C.R. 128 · Decided: 30-10-1973 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

128 
GUJARAT MINERAL DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION 
A 
v. 
SHRI P. H. BRAHMBHATT 
October 30, 1973 
[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.] 
lndu3trial Disputes Ac1-Respondent a temporary employee ter"Jinattd from 
stri·ic~Whtther termination a discharge sirnpliciter and tlie action take11 by 
the employer, bonafide. 
The respondent was appointed by the appellant in 1967 aa a temporary 
senior Assistant on conditions set out in the letter of appointment. His services 
wece terminated in 1971 when he was still in temporary aervice. Due to ill 
health, the respondent applied for one mdnth's medical leave accompanied by a 
doctor's certificate: but the leave was refused and he was asked to Join duty at 
once because according to the appellant, there was nothing wrong with his 
health. Ultimately, when on January 6, 1971, the employee did not appear for 
medical checkup on the appointed day, the worker was discharged from service 
retroipectively from November 9, 1970, with one months' pay in lieu of notice. 
The Labour Court came to the conclusion, that the discharge was not a dis-
charge simpliciter but an action taken for misconduct and was punitive. 
The 
principles of natural justice were not complied with and the .impusned action 
camo under s. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and so, the appellant 
Wai 
directed to reinstate the respondent with half the wases from the date of dis-
charge till the date of . his reinstatement. 
. Before this Court, it was contended by the respondent that the order of di~­
charge was defective because it purported to terminate the service of the respon-
dent retrospectively from the day from which his services were not available to 
the Corporation as he was absent without leave from November 9, 1970. The 
appellants' counsel contended that where under a contract of service there 
i'3 
power to terminate the services, that .power having been exercised bonafide, the 
termination cannot be held invalid. The question for decision before this Court 
was whether the Special ·Labour Court arrived at a pervene findiq, or a ft.ad-
ing not warranted by the eVidence on record; or, were there any errors apparent 
on the face of the record which vitiated that finding. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HEID (i) The order of termination cannot be held to be defective merely 
because tho order was to take effect retrospectively from November 9, 1970. The 
intention of the Corporation was to termmate the services of the respondent 
from the dato from wpich his services were not avail~ble to the Corporation. 
Even if the super·added part, namely, that the order should operate retrospec· 
tively as from an anterior date, is invalid. there is no reason why the first part 
of the order discharging the services of the respondent as from t,tie date of the 
ordCr. does not take effect. 
Therefore, the order discharging the services of the 
respondent cannot be held to be iµvalid. 
[134C] 
Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras, [196711 LL.J. 391, referred to. 
(ii) Normally, an employer may terminate the services _under the terms of 
the contract or the standing orders as duly certified. but where an 
Industrial 
Dispute is raised, the form of the order is not conclusive and tho tribunal to 
·which the dispute is referred can examine the question whether the discharae is 
punitive, malafide or arbitrary. If it comes to any of these conclusion, it can 
direct the reinstatement of the employee; but should not do so if the employer 
has lost his confidence in the employee. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the 
order is punitive. or malafide, or is made to victimise the workmen or amount! 
to unfair labour practice, it is competent to set it aside. The test is whether the 
act of the employer is bonafide or not. If it is not. and is a colourable exercise 
of the power under the contract of service, or standing orders, the Tribunal can 
discard it in a proper case. and direct re·instatement. 
[134E] 
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Prasad, (1969] 2 L.L.J. 779, 
referred to. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
G 
II 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
II 
GUJARAT M.O.C. v. BRAHMBHATT (laganmohan Reddy, I). 
129 
(iii) This Court ordinarily does not entertain pleas on questions of fact, or 
interfere with the findinas of .. fact so ·,as to convert itself into a third court of 
fact. 
But the Court will not hesitate to interfere with the findings 
of fact, 
where there has been illegality or an irregularity of procedure, or a violation of 
the principl

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