LexGRINDLAYS BANK LTD. versus CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AND ORS.
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' .. • 341 GRINDLAYS BANK LTD. v. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AND ORS. December 12, 1980 [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J. AND A. P. SEN, J.J Powers of the Industrial Tribunal to set aside an ex-parte award passed un merits--Whether such an ex parte award passed on nierits, when sought to be set aside by an application showing sufficient cause amounts to seeking review- Point of time at lVhich jurisdiction of the Tribunal begins, for setting aside the ex parte award-Rule of statutory construction-Industrial Disputel Act, 1957, sections 11, 17, 17-A and 20 part Ill of the Industrial Dispute (Central) Rulea, 1957, 01ders IX and XVII of the Civil Procedure Code. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : ( 1) It is a well-kno,vn rule of statutory construction that a Tribu- nal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or inci- dental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statute to the contrary. The \Vords "shall foJlow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority may think fit" in sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act are of the widest amplitude and confer ample power upon the Tribune.I and other autho- rities to devise such procedure as the. justice of the case demands. The discre- tion thus conferred on these authorities to determine the procedure as they may think fir, however, is subject to the rules made by the 'appropriate Government' in this behalf. Nevertheless, all these authorities being quasi-judicial in nature objectively determining matters referred to them, have to exercise their discre- tion in a judicial manner, without caprice, and according to the genl.'.:ral princi- ples of law and rules of natural justice. [344 E-F, H, 345A, C, Fl (2) \\1iere a party is prevented from appearing at the hearing due to a sufficient cause and is faced with an ex parte award, it is as if the party is visited with an award without a notice of the proceedings. Where the Tribunal proceeds to make an award without notice to a party, the award is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not only the power but nlso the dury to set aside the ex parte award and to direct the matter to be heard afresh. Further, Rules 22 and 24(b) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 make it clear that the Tribunal was competent to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte award. [346 C-E] A B c D E F G (3) Merely becduse the ex parte award was based on the staten1ent of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, does nor amount to review. The expression "review" is used in two distinct H senses, namely, (i) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order p0ssed under a • 6---57 SCI/81 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R. A misapprehension by it, and (ii) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is appClrent on the face of the record. When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be. corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal. [347 B-C, E-G] B Narsfii Thakershi v. Pradvumansinghji, A.l.R. [1970] SC 1273, distinguished. (4) The Tribunal had not become functus officio and, therefore, had the jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award. To contend that the Central Go- vernment alone could t1et aside the ex parte a·ward is not correct. Under section 17-A an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 dais from the date of its publication under section 17. The proceedings \Vith regard to a reference under section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be • C concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. D Til1 then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the po\.ver to entertain an appli- cation in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A. [347 G, 348 A-Bl (5) The jurisdiction of the Trib_unal had
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