GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS & ORS. versus TARAK NATH GHOSH

Citation: [1971] 3 S.C.R. 715 · Decided: 12-02-1971 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.K. MITTER · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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715 
GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS & ORS. 
v. 
TARAK NA'IH GHOSH 
February 12, 1971 
[G. K. MITTER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.] 
AJl India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, rr. 5(2) & 7-
Civll Servant-Suspension-If can be ordered in contemplation of disci-
p/mary proceedings. 
Serious allegations of corruption and malpractices had been made 
against the respondent, a member of the Indian Police Service, serving 
in the State of Bihar. Inquiries made by the State Government revealed 
that there was a primc. facie. case made out against him. He was sus-
pended by an order which stated that disciplinary proceedings were con-
templated against the respondent. 
On the question whether the suspension of a member of the service 
can only be ordered after definite charges have been communicated to 
him in terms of r. 5(2) of the All India Se1"ices (Discipline and Appeal) 
Rules, 1955, or whether the Government is entitled to place him under 
suspension even before that stage has been reached after a preliminary 
jnvestigation, 
HELD : ( 1) The fact that in other rules of service there is specific 
provision for an order of suspension even when disciplinary proceedings 
were contemplated. does not mean that a member of the All India Service 
should be dealt with differently. It would not be proper to interpret the 
Rules, which form a self-contained Code, by reference to the provisions 
of other rules even if they were made by or under the authority of the 
President of India. [718 F-G] 
(2) Rule 7 expressly provides for suspension of a member 01 the 
service, having regard to the nature of the charges, for the purpose of 
disciplinary proceedings. The word 'charges' in the rule means accusa-
tions or imputations against a member of the service. If the disciplinary 
authority takes note of the allegation and is of the opinion after preli-
minary inquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further inves-
tigation to be made before definite charges can be framed it would not 
be improper to remove the officer from the sphere of his activity either 
by transfer or oy suspension inasmuch as it may be necessary to find 
out facts from people working under him or look into papers which are 
in his custody. ordinarily when serious imputations are made against the 
conduct of an officer, the disciplinary authorities cannot immediately draw 
up the charges and in some cases a considerable time may elapse before 
the superior authority can come to a conclusion that definite charges can 
be levelled against the officer. 
Merely because the order mentions, that 
the disciplinary proceedings were contemplated_ it cannot be held that the 
situation in the present '-ase had not reached the stage which called for 
an order of suspension. 
In substance, disciplinary proceedings can be 
said to have been started when complaints about the integrity of an officer 
are entertained, followed by a preliminary inquiry into them culminating 
716 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1971) 3 SC.R. 
in the satisfac.tion of the Government that a prima facie case h,;.; been 
made out agamst him for the framing of charges. 
When the order of 
~usp~ns1on ~~self shows that ~he Government was of the ·view that such 
a pnnza fatie case f~r launching departmental proceedings has b~cn made 
out the fact that the i;>rder also mentions that such procecdin s were con· 
templated makes no difference. [721 B-F; 723 G; 724 G-H; 7~5 B-C] 
S. Gorinda Menon v. Union o} India, [ 1967] 2 S.C.R. 566, followed. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2338 of 
1968. 
Appeal from the judgment. and order dated March 31, 1965 of 
the j:>atna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 1207 of 1964. 
Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General and B. K. P. Sinha, for the 
appellants. 
B, C. Ghosh, P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for the! respon-
-Oent. 
The Judgment of the tourt was delivered by 
Mitter, J. 
The question in this appeal is, 
whether the 
·order of suspension passed on the respondent on July 31, 1964 
·was properly struck down by the Patna High Court. 
The facts are as follows. 
The respondent is a member of 
the Indian Police Service appointed on 25th January, 1937 and 
at the material time he was holding the substantive railk of 
Deputy Superintendent of Police in Bihar. 
In June 1962 he 
was posted at Ranchi. He was transferred to Patna and appoint-
.ed as Special Officer, Political, General and Transport Depart-
ment on July 23, 1964
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