GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. versus GANPATI RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS.
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[2013] 8 S.C.R. 461 GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. v. GANPATI RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS. (Civil Appeal No. 1675 of 2004) JULY 29, 2013 [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.] Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948: s.32G - Proceedings under - Initiated by tenant - Rejected by Additional Tehsi/dar holding that the land was leased out for growing sugarcane - Appellate-authority set it aside holding that landlord failed to prove the specific purpose A B c of the lease - Revisional Court gave its finding in favour of 0 landlord, and held that the land was leased out for growing sugarcane - High Court, in writ petition set aside the order of revisional court - Held: The order of the authority was perverse as its conclusion was without reference to the evidence - Therefore, High Court erred in setting aside the order of E revisional court. s. 43A - Applicability of - Whether applicable to single person - High Court in view of plural expressions in the provision held that the provision covers only those cases in which lease is given to more than one person - Held: In view F of s. 13 of Bombay General Clauses Act which provides that singular shall include the plural and vice versa, plural expression will include singular - Thus, s.43A would be applicable to single person - Bombay General ClausesAct, 1904- s.13. Revision - Jurisdiction of revisional court - Scope of - Held: Revisional court ordinarily does not reappraise the evidence - But where finding recorded by appellate authority is perverse, it can upset the finding of appellate authority. G 461 H 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 8 S.C.R. A Evidence - Nature of evidence - In agricultural tenancy case - Held: Such cases are decided on the preponderance of probability - Principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply in such proceedings. B The respondent-tenant initiated proceedings u/s. 32G of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 for determination of price of the land on the pela that he shall be deemed to have purchased the land. The Additional Tehsildar held that the land in question was leased out by the appellant land-holder for growing sugarcane and C accordingly dropped the proceedings. Appellate authority allowed the appeal of the tenant on giving finding that the landlord failed to prove the specific purpose of the lease. Landlord filed revision petition, which was allowed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal setting aside the order of D the appellate authority and restoring the order of the Additional Tehsildar. Tenant's writ petition was allowed by High Court setting aside the order of the Tribunal. It was held that the land was not leased out for cultivation of sugarcane and further held that s.43A of the Act would E not govern the field as the lease in question was not given to more than one person. Hence the present appeal by the landlord. Allowing the appeal, the Court F HELD: 1.1. The revisional court ordinarily does not reappraise the evidence, but in case it is found that the finding recorded by the appellate authority is perverse, nothing prevents it from upsetting the finding of the appellate authority. If the appellate authority records a G finding without consideration of the relevant material or on consideration of irrelevant material or the finding arrived at is such that no person duly instructed in law can reach at that finding, such finding in law is called perverse and in such a contingency, it is within the H jurisdiction of the revisional court to set aside the said GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS. v. GANPATI RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS. finding. [Para 6] [467-F-H] 463 A B 1.2. In. the present case, the finding recorded by the Sub-Divisional Officer (appellate authority) is patently perverse. The Sub-Divisional Officer fl.as referred to the statement of the landlord and his witnesses that the land was leased out for growing sugarcane but rejected the evidence on the ground that the "landlord and his witnesses have not been ab~e to prove the purpose of lease beyond reasonable doubt" and ultimately held that "the landlord has failed to prove the specific purpose of C the lease." While doing so, the Sub-Divisional Officer has lost sight of the basic principle that the nature of the proceeding is decided on the preponderance of probability and the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply in su
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