GOPI CHAND versus THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

Citation: [1959] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 87 · Decided: 20-01-1959 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
87 
GOPI CHAND 
v. 
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION 
(S. R. DAS, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, 
K. N. WANCHOO and HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.) · 
Criminal Trial-Temporary enactment-Provision for trial of 
specified offences under summons procedure in notified areas-Con-
stitutional validity-Applicability to proceedings pending on expiry 
of enactment-Absence of saving provision-East Punjab Public 
Safety Act, r949 (Punj. 5 of r949), ss. 36(I), 2o-Constitution of 
India, Art. r4-General Clauses Act, r879 (Io of r879), s. 6. 
Section 36(1) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, r949, 
(Punj. 5 of r949), which was passed in the wake of the partition 
disturbances in India with a view to ensure public safety and 
the maintenance of public order, provided that offences mention-
ed therein and committed in the area declared to be dange-
rously disturbed under s. 20 of the Act, should be tried under the 
summons procedure prescribed by Ch. XX of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure. By the first notification issued under s. 20 of 
the Act, the whole of the Province of Delhi was declared to be a 
dangerously disturbed area; subsequently the second notifica-
tion purported to cancel the first. The third notification then 
sought to modify the second by inserting into it the words "except 
as respect things done or omitted to be done before this notifi-
cation". The fourth and last notification issued under s. 36(r) 
of the Act sought to save proceedings thereunder pending after 
the cancellation of the first notification. The appellant who 
was put up for trial in three cases for offences ordinarily triable 
under the warrant procedure, was tried under the summons pro-
cedure according to s. 36(r) of the Act and the first notification 
and the trials were continued even after the expiry of the Act in 
respect of substantial parts of them under the same procedure 
and ended in his conviction which was affirmed by the High 
Court in appeal. The Act was a temporary Act and contained 
no provision saving pending proceedings. It was contended on 
behalf of the appellant that the first part of s. 36(1) of the Act 
in treating the disturbed areas as a class by themselves and pro-
viding a uniform procedure for the trial of specified offences 
violated Art. r4 of the Constitution and that the continuance of 
the trials under the summons procedure even after.the expiry of 
the Act was invalid. · 
Held, that the two tests of the validity of the classification 
made by the Legislature were, (r) that t~e classification must be 
based on an intelligible differentia and (2) that this differentia 
must be reasonably connected with the object of the legislation. 
Thus tested, there could be no doubt, in the present case, that 
the classification on a geographical basis made by the impugned 
I959 
January 20. 
I959 
Gopi Chand 
v. 
The Delhi 
Administration 
88 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. 
Act between areas that were dangerously disturbed and other 
areas, in the interest of speedy trial of offences, was perfectly 
justified. 
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [r959] S.C.R. 279, 
relied on. 
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay, [r952] 
S.C.R. 7ro, held inapplicable. 
But since the impugned Act was a temporary Act and con-
tained no appropriate provision saving the summons procedure 
prescribed by it, that procedure could not, on the expiry of the 
Act, apply to the cases pending against the appellant. 
Krishnan v. The State of Madras, [r95r] S.C.R. 62I, relied 
on. 
Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1947] A.C. 362, 
referred to. 
The third and the fourth notifications, obviously intended 
to cure the absence of a saving provision in the Act, were wholly 
outside the authority conferred on the delegate by s. 20 or 
s. :;6(1) of the Act and must be held to be invalid. With the 
issue of the second notification, therefore, the entire province 
of Delhi ceased to be a dangerously disturbed area. 
It was erroneons to apply by analogy the provisions of s. 6 
of the General Clauses Act to cases governed by a te1nporary 
Act, such as the one in question, which did not contain the 
appropriate saving provision and contend that since the trials 
had commenced validly, their continuance under the same pro-
cedure even after the declaration had ceased to operate and 
subsequent orders of conviction and sentence passed therein were 
valid as well. 
Srinivasachari v. The Queen, (r883) I.L.R. 6 Mad.

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