GOPALAKRISHNA PILLAI AND OTHERS versus MEENAKSHI AYAL AND OTHERS

Citation: [1966] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 128 · Decided: 31-03-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SARKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

128 
GOPALAKRISHNA PILLAI AlliD OTHERS 
v. 
MEENAKSHI A Y AL AlliD OTHERS 
March 31, 1966 
(A. K. SARKAR C.J., J. R. MliDHOLKAR ASD R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.J 
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 20. r. 12 future mesne profits-
Wh'1n can be grated by Court. 
S. d'ied in 1927 and bv a will bequeathed some items of property 
A 
B 
to his wife N and certain other property to his mother C. He also 
appointed C as a trustee of some property fo" the benefit of a temple. 
C 
Upon the death of N in 1931, C inherited her properties as a limited 
heir. 
Some of this property was sold by C under a sale deed in June 
1957; by a deed executed in August 1940 she gifted some of the other 
inherited property to M and thcreaftec purported to execute a will 
in September 194il. bequeathing to M the remainini: properties be-
longing to her and inherited by her as a limited heir from N, as also 
her trusteeship rights in the p'operty left by S. 
After C's death on September 15, 194il, M conveyed all the pr0-
perties acquired by him under the gift deed and tho '.Viii to V. V died 
in 1943 leaving some of the defendants as his heirs. 
D 
ln about August 1952 the respondents instituted 
a suit and 
claimed the properties left by C and N as their heirs. The'' denied 
the factum and validity of the sale deed, the gift deed as well as the 
will of September 1940. 
E 
• 
The Courts below held that C had no power to disnose of the 
properties which she had inherited from N as a limited heir; that 
'?1~ 
there was no sale by the deed executed in June 1957; and that the 
gift deed executed by her was valid. 
TheSe findings 
were not 
challenged in the appeal to this Court. 
The Trial Court, however. held that the respondents had failed 
to prove that they were entitled to inherit the properties on the 
F 
death of C. and that the will of September 4, 1940 was forged. On 
appeal to the High Court, the single bench upheld the will and also 
directed that the question whether the respondents were the next 
revcrsioners of N should be tried afresh by the Trial Court. But in 
a Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench held the will was not 
genuine and its execution and attestation v;erc not proved: it also 
held that on the materials on the record the respondents must be 
held to te the next reversioners of N. 
The Court therefore passed 
a decree in favour of the respondents for recovery of the various 
G 
items of p:-operty and deelared that they w"re entitled to mesne Pr<>-
fits for three years prior to the suit and also to future mesne profits 
in respect of the various properties; accordingly it directed an inquiry 
by the Trial Court to determine futuce mesne profits. 
In the appeal to this Court by some of the defendants. it was 
also contended that the High Court had no power to pass a decre" 
for mesne profits accrued after the institution of the suit as there H 
\Vas no specific prayer for such a decree. 
128 
• 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
GOPALAKRISHNA v. MEENAKSHI (Bachawat, J.) 
129 
HELD: On the facts, the High Court had rightly held that the 
appellants had failed to prove the execution and attestation of the 
will. [131 F-GJ 
The trial proceeded on the footing that the plaintiffs were the 
next reversioners of N and the High Court was therefore right in 
holding that it was not open to the appellants to contend that the 
respondents were not the reversionery heirs of N. [132 BJ. 
On a reading of the plaint it was clear that the suit was for re-
covery of possession of immovable property and for mesne profits. 
The provisions of Order 20, r. 12 were therefore attracted to the suit 
and the court had power to pass a decree in the suit for both past 
and future mesne profits. [132 F] 
Order 20, r. 12 enables the court to pass a decree for both past 
ancf future mesne profits but there are important distinctions in the 
procedure for the enforcement of the two claims. With regard to 
past mesne profits, a plaintiff has an existing cause of action on the 
date of the institution of the suit. In view of 0. 7, rr. 1 and 2 and 0. 7, 
r. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and s. 7(1) of the Court Fees Act, 
the plaintiff must plead this cause of action, specifically claim a 
decree for the past mesne profits, value the claim approximately and 
pay court-fees thereon. With regard to future mesne profits, the 
plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the institution of the 
suit, and it is not possible for him to plead this cause of action or to 
value i

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