GOPAL SARAN versus SATYANARAYANA

Citation: [1989] 1 S.C.R. 767 · Decided: 20-02-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

I 
GOPAL SARAN 
v. 
SATYANARAYANA 
FEBRUARY 20, 1989 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.] 
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950: 
Section 13(1)(e)-Tenant-Sub letting-Liability to eviction-When 
arises-Tenant doing advertisement business-Putting up hoarding-
Parting with possession-Assignment-What constitutes. 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Sections 137 and 138-Cross exami-
nation-Plaintiff need not be cross examined beyond evidence given in 
examination in chief-Opportunity not to be given to make out a case in 
cross examination. 
The respondent-Landlord filed a suit for eviction against the 
appellant-tenant on 3 grounds, namely, (I) that the tenant had parted 
with possession of the roof of the shop let out to him by putting up an 
advertisement board, (ii) by fixing the advertisement board on the roof 
of the shop with iron angles, the tenant had caused material alteration 
to the premises, and (iii) the tenant had defaulted in the payment of 
rent. The tenant asserted that though he was carrying on optical busi-
ness in the shop he was also running the business of advertisement by 
way of display of various advertisements (hoardings) boards at various 
places in the city. The Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of 
default in payment of rent, material alteration and sub-letting. 
The appellant preferred an appeal and the District Judge reman-
ded the case back to the Trial Court for trial on all issues, on the ground 
that the appellant had not been allowed to cross-examine the respon-
dent or to adduce evidence in defence. 
On remand, the Trial Court held that the appellant had caused 
material alteration by fixing the board on the roof, had parted with 
possession of the roof by such fixing of the board, had committed 
default in payment of rent, and passed a decree for eviction against the 
appellant for causing material alteration and for parting with the 
possession of the roof. No decree was however passed on the ground of 
default, because the default was held to be the first default. 
767 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
768 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 
A 
The appellant filed an appeal, and the District Judge allowed the 
appeal on the ground that by displaying the advertisement board, the 
appellant had not caused any material alteration of the premises and 
that by displaying such advertisement board did not amount to parting 
with possession of the roof of the premises. With regard to default, on 
an analysis of the dates of the payment, the District Judge held that 
B there was no default in payment of rent for six months, but held that the 
default was the first default and consequently there could be no decree 
for eviction. 
The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court. The 
appeal was allowed only on the issue of parting with possession, holding 
that the display of the advertisement board amounted to parting with 
C 
possession of the premises. The High Court noted that the appellant had 
not disputed thaJ the advertisement board was installed on the roof of 
the shop and that he was getting the rent for this board, and the docu-
ment which was tendered, viz: Exhibit 6 showed that the company 
Paramount Services had written a letter to the respondent-landlord that 
D 
they had installed the board on the terrace of the shop and the site was 
with them for the last six months. The High Court accordingly conclu-
ded that there was parting with possession by the tenant, and the land-
lord was therefore entitled to a decree for eviction under section 13(l)(e) 
of the Act. In view of this finding under section 13(l)(e) of the Act, the 
High Court held it was unnecessary to go into the other grounds and 
E 
passed a decree for eviction. 
In the appeal by the tenant to this Court on the questions: (I) 
Whether the appellant was carrying on his own advertising business? 
(2) Whether such an act can be termed as parting with possession of the 
roof or any part thereof by the appellant in favour of the advertiser 
F 
because by putting up such hoarding, he was getting a return? (3) Ifit is 
found that it was not a business of the appellant to carry on the advertis-
ing, but the appellant had also an advertising agency to pot up its 
advertising board then would such an act amount to parting with 
possession of the roof or any part thereof by the appellant? (4) In any 
event can any case or cause of action for the suit tiled in 1974 on the 
G 
basis of Ex

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