GOPAL NARAIN versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

Citation: [1964] 4 S.C.R. 869 · Decided: 03-09-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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4 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
869 
GOPAL NARAIN 
tJ.. 
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHoo, 
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MuoHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Constitution 
of 
India, 
Arts. 14, 
19(1)(f)-Municipality-
Arbitrary power to make classification-Policy and guidance-
Express or implied-To be gathered from the statute-Geographi-
cal division of a town-Special taxes in that part-Whether discri· 
minatory-Validity-Mention of 
wrong clause 
in 
Notification 
Does not affect the power-Uttar Pradesh Municipalties Act, 1916 
(U.P. A.ct No. II of 1916), ss. 128(1), 13l(l)(h). 
The city of Bareilly was originally composed of two parts. In 
1870, the vacant area between these two parts was developed into 
a new residential area by the Municipality at a considerable 
cost. 
Special amenities for the residents of this area were pro-
vided and house tax was imposed. After the coming into force of 
Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916, the Municipality imposed, 
first, a latririe ux and later a scavenging tax in this area 
from 
1939. The petitioner who is a resident and house owner in this 
area filed the present petition questioning the validity of the taxes 
imposed by the Municipality. 
The main contentions raised by the petitioner were: (i) s. 
128(1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, in so far as it authorised 
the Municipal Board to impose the taxes mentioned therein 
in 
part of the Municipality, offended Art. 14 of the Constitution and, 
therefore, was void ; (ii) even if the section did not violate 
the said article, the notification issued by the Municipal 
Board 
imposi;ig the two taxes namely, house tax and scavenging 
tax, 
confining them only to the new area (civil lines) was void in as 
much as such imposition could not be justified on the basis of the 
doctrine of classification, (iii) the taxes were imposed in violation 
of the statutory provisions of the Act and 
therefore 
the 
imposition on him in respect of his building i~fringed his' right 
under Art. 19(1)\£) of the Constitution; and (iv) s. 13l(l)(b) 
of the Act also violated Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as 
it conferred an arbitrary power on the Municipal Board to impose 
tax~s of any a1nount on any person or class of persons without 
laying down any clear policy for classification. 
. Held: (i) While a court should be on its guard not to enter 
into. the dor:ia1n 
~£ speculation with a view to cover up an 
obvious 
d~fic1e~c~ 1_n a legislation, it may legitimately discover 
such a policy! _if it is clearly discernible on a fair reading of the 
rc:Ievant prov1s1ons of the Act. 
But it is neither possible nor ad-
v1s~ble to lay down precisely how a court should cull out such 
policy from an Act in the absence of an express statuto; 
1963 
September 3 
1963 
Go pal Narain 
v. 
State of 
Uttar Praduh 
qnd Anr. 
870 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1%4] 
declaration of policy. It would depend upon the provisions of each 
Act, including the preamble. But what can be posited is that the 
policy must appear clear either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion fron1 the provisions of the statute itself. 
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shl'i fustice S. R. Tendolkal', [19591 
S.C.R. 279, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] 
S.C.R. 284, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pra-
desh, [ 1954 J S.C.R. 803, Dhil'endra K1·ishna Mondo/ v. Superin-
tendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, [1955] 
l 
S.C.R. 
244, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [ 1952] S.C.R. 
435, P. Balakotaih v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 
1052 
and 
M /s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [!957] S.C.R. 233, refer· 
red to. 
(ii) A fair reading of ss. 7, 8 and 128 of the Act makes it 
clear that the amounts collected by the Municipal Board by \Vay 
of taxes are mainly intended to enable the Board to discharge its 
duties in the Municipal area or part of the Municipal area, as the 
case n1ay be. 
These duties and functions need not necessarily 
be discharged or perfonned in the entire area of the municipality 
at once. 
If different parts of a municipality may require special 
treatment in the n1atter of provisions of amenities) it \VoulJ be 
reasonable to collate the power of taxation in a part of a muni-
cipality with such separate treatment. This legislative guidance is 
apparent from the three sections. 
(iii) Looking at the policy disclosed by ss. 7, 8 and 128 of the 
Act an<l applying the liberal view a law of taxation rec

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