GOJER BROS. PVT. LTD. versus RATAN LAL SINGH

Citation: [1975] 1 S.C.R. 394 · Decided: 01-05-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
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Judgment (excerpt)

GOJER BROS. PVT. LTD. 
v. 
RATAN LAL SINGH 
May I, 1974 
[Y. V. Chandrachud, P. K. Goswami and R. S. Sarkaria, JJ.] 
394 
West Bengal Premises Tenancy (A1nendme11t) Act 1968-S. 1 ~'D-Whether 
it applies to an appellate decree passed by the High Courr after coming into 
force of the said Act-If the decree of the trial Court merges 1'1110 the degree 
of the High Court. 
A 
Il 
In 1953 the predecessors-in-title of the appellants filed a suit for eviction 
against the respondent on the ground ·of non-payment of rent. In 1958 the 
learned Se.cond Munsif~ passed a decree fot possession in favour of the Plain-
tiffs holding that the respondent was not entitled to the protection of the 
C 
West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1950. The 
decree was confirmed in appeal by the learned Subordinate Judger in 1967. 
During the pendency of the appeal, the -a_Ppellants had purchased the right 
title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit premises and they had also ob-
tained an assign_men.t. of the d~cretal rights in their favour. 
The respondent 
filed a second appeal and that too was dismissed by the High Court by a 
judgment dated January 5, 1969. The respondent gave a written undertak-
ing that he will give quiet possession to the appellants after the expiry of 
the period granted by the Court. 
[) 
The West Bengal Premises Rent Control 
(Temporary 
provisions) 
Act, 
1950 was repealed by S. 40 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1955 
which was later amended in 1968. with retrospective effect and in between 
the decree for possession passed by the High Court and the expiry of the 
period allowed to the respondent to vacate the premises. several amendments 
were made in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1955. The present ap-
peal is concerned with Section 17D which was introduced in 1969. The said 
section provides that where before the commencement of the West Bengal 
Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1968 a decree for the recovery of pos-
session was passed in a suit under the 1950 Act by reason only of clause ( 1) 
of the proviso to sub section ( 1) of Sec. 12 of that ACt but the possession 
had not been recovered, the tenant may apply within 60 days from the date 
of commencement of the We_st Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) 
Act 1969, to the court which passed the decree to set aside the decree, 
E 
The respondent, on January 12 .. 1970, which was a few days berore he 
had undertaken to vacate the premises, rp_ade an application under S. 17D 
F 
asking that the decree for possession passed against him be set aside. The 
learned Munsiff however, dismissed the application on the ground that the 
decree for possession passed _by the trial Court had merged in the decree 
passed by the High Court and as that decree was passed after the date of 
commencement. of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) 
Act~ 
1968, the application by the respondent was not maintainable. 
The respondent filed a revision application in the High Court against the 
judgment of the learned Munsif and the High Court allo\\·ed the revision 
application, granted the application filed by the respondent under S. 17D and 
directed the dismissal of the suit. The appellants appealed to the Supreme 
Court by Special leave. 
,,_ 
The questi-on which ~ose for consideration is whether .the decree for the 
recovery of possession can be said to have been passed against the respondent 
"before the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Ten::incy l Amendment) 
Act 1968 .. , that is, before August 26. 1967. The Trial Court passed the decree 
on Nov. 24, 1958 which was before the commencement of the Act of 1968;~ 
but the decree of High Court is dated January 5, 1969. 
The question to be 
considered was whether the decree passed by the trial court can be deemed 
to have merged in the decree passed by the High Court. 
G 
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GOJER BROS v. R. L. SINGH (Chandrachud, !.) 
395 
A 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD ; ( 1 ) The doctrine of merger is based on the principle that there can-
not be. at one and the same time more than one operative order governing 
the same subject matter. Therefore the judgment of an inferior court, 
if 
subjected to an examination by _the superior oourt, ceases tu have existence 
in the eye of law and is treat~ as being superseded by the judgment of the 
superior court. In other words, the judgment 9f the inferior court loses its 
B 
identity by its merger with the judgment of the superio
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