LexGODAVARI SUGAR MILLS LTD. AND ORS. versus S. B. KAMBLE AND ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A
c
885
GODAVARI SUGAR MILLS LTD. AND ORS.
V.
S. B. KAMBLE AND ORS.
March 7. 1975
[H. R. KHAN.'iA, P. N. B1IAGWAJ'J AND P. K. GOSW,\J\IJ, JJ.]
Mllharashtra Agricultural Land,- (Ceilings aiul Holdi11gs) Act, (27 of 1961)
as amrnded by Acts of 1968, 1969 and 19i0-Prbicipa/ Act i11ci11ded in rhe Nin//;
.\rhedu/e-Amending Acts if prolected by Art. 31A or 31B.
.
The l\faharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act .1961 t:ame
into force on fanuary 26. 1962.
The constitutional validity of ihe A~t wa.~
· challcngcJ in the High Court and 1he High Court held that the provisions of the
A~t. other than s. 28, were a measure of agrarian reform and were protected
by Art. 3 lA of the Con•titution .. St;ction 28, however, was held to be violative
of .Art. 14.
In_ 1964, the Constltu.!Ion \17th Amendme'!t) Act wu passed, as
a rewlt of which the 1961 Act, mcludmg s. 28. was included in the Ninth
Schedule. The 1961 Act was amended by various Maharashtra Acts namely
Ac! .16 of i968, 33 of 1968, 37 of 1969 and 27 of 1970. The
con~t:.tutional
validity of the 1961-A~t as amended by the vari_o1!S Maharashtra Acts; was again
challenged but the High Court upheld the validity of the Act u mnended on
the ground that it was protected by Arts. 31A and 31B of the Constitulfon.
0
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
F
G
ff
liELD: Though the various amendments to the Act of 1961 were not
protected by Art. 3 IB, they are, however. protected by Art. 3 IA of the
Constitution. [898 C-D; 907 A-Bl
·
1 (a) The object of Art. 31B is to give a blanket protection to the Acts and
Regulations specified in Ninth Schedule and the provisions of those Acts and
Regulations, against any challenge to them on the ground that they are incon-
~istent with, or take away, or abridge, any of the fundamental rights in Part m.
This immunity would be available notwithstanding any judgment, decree Or order
of any court or tribunal to the contrary! [S96 H-897 Bl
(Ii) The specification of an Act or. Regulation in the schedule would not
prevent the competent legislature from repealing or amending it.
The inclusion
of the Act or Regulation in the Ninth Schedule would protect not only the
principal Act or Regulation which is included in the Mnth Schedule but also
the amendments whi:h have been made therein till the date of she,/1 inclusio11
even though the constitutional amendment by which it is included in the Ninth
Schedule refers only to the Principal Act or Regulation and not to the amend-
ments made till then. [897 C-D]
(c) But the inclusion in the Ninth Schedule would not extend the protection
lo any amendmen'.s made in the Act or Regulation after the date of its inclusion
in the Ninth Schedule. The inclusion of the A:t or Regulation in the Ninth
Schedule is brought about mtly by means of an amendment of the Constitution
by the prescribed majority in each house of Parliament under Art. 368. It is for
the prescribed majority in each house, to decide whether a particular Act or
Regulation should be inserted in the Ninth Schedule. In cate the PTO!ection
afforded by the Article is ex'.ended to amendmen11 made In tbe /i;;t or Regulation
subsequent tci its inc~usion in the S~hedule., the ~It would be •. f!iat C\'C!l those
proviswns would en1oy the protection which were never scrutinised and could
• not, in !he very nature of things. have been scrut;inised by the presen'bed majority
vested with· the power of amending the Constitution. It would be tantamount
to giving a power to State Legislatures to amend tlte Constitution in such a way
as wolllcjl enlarge the contents of Ninth Schedule. {897 'D-H]
(d) The protection of Art: 31B.cannot also be .invoked .for a new provision
inserted by amendmcn.t after m~lu~1on of the 'Act m '.h.e Nmth Sc~edule on !he
ground that it is ancillary or mc1dental to tie rrov1S1ons to which protectmn
s 86
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 51 3 s.c.R.
has already been afforded by such inclmion. Any provision which has the effect
of making an inroad into the guarantee of fundamental rights s(10uld be construed
very strictly and it would not be permissible to widen the scope of such a
provision or to extend the frontiers of the protected zone beyond what is war-
ranted by the language of the provision. The entitlement to protection being
confined only to the Acts, Regulations and provisions which
are
expressly
mentioned in that Schedule, it cannot be extended to provisions which wExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.