GNANAMBAL AMMAL versus T. RAJU AYYAR AND OTHERS.

Citation: [1950] 1 S.C.R. 949 · Decided: 21-12-1950 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
949 
render any assistance to them. An omission to pro-
1950 
vide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be 
d. d b 
h S 
C 
d 
· 
fJanardan Reddy 
reme 1e 
y t e 
upreme 
ourt an 
assumption o 
d Oth 
jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words 
an 
v. "' 
i!O' 
of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to mak-
Tile Stat•· 
ing legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never 
its function to do. 
Kania o. J. 
The petitions, under the circumstances, are rejected. 
Petitions dismissed. 
Agent for the petitioners : I. N. Shroff. 
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta. 
GNANAMBAL AMMAL 
v. 
T. RAJU A YYAR AND OTHERS. 
[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and 
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] 
Hindu law-Will-Construction-General pinciples-Presunw 
tion ag iinst intestacy. 
The cardinal maxim to be observea by courts in construing a 
will is to endeavour to ascertain the intentions of the testi:i.tor. 
This intention has to be gathered primarily from the language of 
the document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in 
any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have 
done if he had been better informed or better advised. 
~ 
The courts are however entitled and bound to bear in mind 
other matters than merely the words used. 
They must consider 
~-, 
the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his 
family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a 
particular sense, and many other things which are often summed 
up in the somewhat picturesque figure 'the court is entitled to 
put itself into the testator's armch&ir '. 
But all this is solely ae an aid to arriving at a right construc-
tion of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of the language -
when used by that particular testator in that document. 
As soon 
as the construction is settled, the duty of the court is to carry 
out the intentions as expressed. The court is in no c•se justified 
in adding to testarnentary dispositions. 
In all cases it musb 
loyally carry out the will as properly construed, &nd thi~ duty is 
1950 
Dec. 21. 
• 
• 
1950 
GnanambaZ 
Ammal 
v. 
'l', Raju Ayyar 
and Others. 
950 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[ 1950) 
universal, and is true alike of wills of every nationality and every 
religion or ra.nk of life. 
A presumption against intestacy may be ra!sed if it is justified 
by the context of the document or the surrounding circumstances; 
but it can be invoked only when tbe"e is undoubted ambiguity in 
ascertainment of the intentions of the testator. 
It cannot be that 
merely with a view to avoiding intestacy you are to do otherwise 
than construe plain words a.ccording to their plain mea.ning. 
A Hindu died leaving 
a widow, a widowed daughter N, 
and a married daughter G, after he had ma.de a will giving 
authority to bis widow to adopt a son of G should she beget one, 
or in tbe alternative a. son of One of his nephews. 
Para. 4 of the 
will provided that if his widow adopted G's son all bis properties 
except the village of K and the house at I and other properties 
disposed of by the will shall pass to the adopted son ; and par&. 5 
provided as follows: "The whole of the village of Kand tho 
house al I, my daughter N shall enjoy with life interest and after 
her the said properly shall pass to my daughter G and her children 
on p•yment by the latter of Rs. 5,000 to A, the daughter of N." 
Later on, amongst the provisions which he wished to ma.ke if a. 
son of a nephew was adopted, there was a provision which ran as 
follows: " Para. 13. 
The village of K shall Le enjoyed by N as 
stated in para. 5.'' 
A nephew's son was arlopted and he insti· 
luted a suit against G after N's death for recovery of the village 
K contending that under para. 13 of the will there was no dis-
position of the village after the life interest of N and on her death 
the village vested in him as the testatof's heir: 
Held, on a construction of the will as a whole, thal the testa-
tor did not intend that in the contingency of the adoption of a 
nephew's son, \he village K should pass, on N's death, to the 
adopted son; on ohe other hand, the provisions of para. 5 of the 
will were intended to apply even in the case of such a contin· 
gency and the village passed to G on N's death under para. 5 of 
the will. 
Judgment of the High Court of Madras reversed. 
Venkatanarasimha v. Parthasarathy (HI.A. 51) and Re Edward; 
Jones v. Jones [1906, 1 Ob. 570], referred to. 
APPELL

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